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covering
this
controversial
topic and added several resofor the nationwide
Obscenity
and the Courts lutions
provided the focal point for problem of obscene films and
the
newly
reconstituted
literature.
The round
table
Thomas Moore Law Society's discussion that followed didn't
second
meeting,
Saturday,
necessarily
resolve the prooMarch 13. Former Assistant lem. Sparked by varying points
District
Attorney
James of view, however, it insured
Clancy opened the discussion TMSL's future success as one
with a review of the case law of Loyola's most prominent
By Frank

B. Myers

Should you be even in a remote way allergic to any sensation mildly identified
with nostalgia,
by all means do
something, ... don't go near the old sidewalk campus, where
Washingtonias
stood as sentinels and gave a local habitation and a name to. the "DId SChDOI" that was Loyola Law
for a generation
of the children
of men ...
Of course, if
you don't mind becoming blear-eyed,
by all means, drop
around for a look-see, ... but approach the spot in reverence
for it'll stir up hallowed memories . . . Another victim Df
urban progress, it fought a losing battle with nosing bulldozers and smoking black-top
...
Even "black acre", that
mythical patch of land that was plowed, tilled, leased, conveyanced and reconveyanced endlessly, provided untold easements and never failed to' produce a reansttc glow in a troublesome problem of transrerrtng
Htle to a 'defaulting taxpayer,
is a nameless nothing
What WALTER H....
as in
liOHFELD ...
COOK
didn't do. with it, tor it was as
pliable as putty in his hands, and he tossed it about with
the touch of the master ... His career of Mr. Chips spanned
the life of the Grand Avenue Maison ...
He made "Readings orr the Law of Contracts," the Book of the Century and
a collectors' item ... None discoursed on "rights, privileges,
powers, and immunities"
as did he and, when he spoke the
last syllable of the last word was said with ultimate finality
...
Only two scraggy trees are holding out against the invasion and tufts of foliage at middle height, make them
look not unlike flags at half-staff
...
In the 'spirit of the
scene a tear is dropped as the wayward wind whispers a.
requiem. This is a spot for memories ... Here was installed
the "Aggeler Plaque", the tDP award for "superior scholarship and noteworthy achievement"
... BALDO KRISTOVICH
'35 was the first recipient and started. a pageant of celebs
that fairly glowed with professional
distinction
...
BALDO
certainly gave it a superb start '.' . Constant occupancy was
his title to a secluded nook in the library, where, outside
of Class, he could be found any hour of the day and not infrequently, at night, tor well he understood that labor is the
law of life for one who. would prosper in the law ...
It's
too bad thalt a plaque doesn't mark the spot where he made
histDry, with some such words as, "Dedicated to the memory
of BALDO KRISTOVICH '35 who did not sleep here." . . .
Ilis professional
career moves at the same tempo as did his
student years ...
Just now as Public Administrator
of Los
Angeles County he has the largest probate practice in Western civiltzatton ... and the largess with which he distributes
other people's wealth, makes Croesus and the Golden Boys
of an opulent elder day look like rank amateurs
...
Here,
too, at the homey, compact Maison, ... where character was
formed and intellect informed, the O'MELVENY trend was
,established,
and GEORGE ElMENDORF '43 lost no time in
(Continued

on page 2)
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OBSCENITY

honorary
scholastic
institutions.
The St. Thomas Moore Society, well known to Loyola's
alumni, gave way this year to
the
newer
TMSL
largely
through
the diligent
efforts
of Tim Sargent and Fr. Vachon. The change, however,
encompassed
far more than
just the name. At regularly
scheduled meetings the TMLS
discusses controversial
areas
of the law aided by selected
members of the faculty and
the legal profession. Membership, formerly
open to the
whole student body, is now on
a selective basis. Numbering
approximately
twenty, the society provides
a forum for
leading students to' break the
monotony
of cases, statutes
and notes by going deeper into' the largely unresolved modern issues facing the legal profession.
The enthusiasm
of the second meeting befitted TMSL's
broad purpose. Members
of
the Black-Douglas
school of
thought
supported
the absolute treedom of speech allegedly guaranteed
by the first
and tourteenth
amendments.
"Congress shall make no law
...
abridging the freedom of
speech," means precisely that
all speech is protected,
and
cannot be proscribed
in any
way by the Federal Dr State
Governments.
This
position
disposes of the problem
in
short
order.
Governmental
bodies are powerless to prohibit the sale of any literary
materials
or the showing of
any films, regardless of their
content.
The consensus, however, was
represented
by a mDre moderate view. The state and 10cal governments
should have
some power to restrict the sale
and display of materials
injurious to the community well
being. The real problem
is
finding
some workable
systern providing a free market
place for ideas, yet restricting
wholesale dealerships in smut.
As in the case of most moderate views, there is no. easy
solution.
Mr. Clancy, a veteran
of
many an obscenity prosecution, suggested that the present status of the law, in effect, is represented
by Chief

Justice
Warren's
dissenting
opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio,
12 L. Ed 2d 793 (1964). In six
separate opinions the U,S. Supreme Court reversed an Ohio
conviction based on the showing of the motion picture "The
Lovers." The inability of the
Court to agree on a basis for
reviewing obscenity prosecutions evidences the great confusion in this area. Nevertheless, Mr. Clancy suggested that,
as in the words of Warren,
"the use to which various materials are put-e-not just the
words and pictures themselves
-must
be considered in determining whether
or not the
materials
are obscene." The
denial of certiorari in numerous state prosecutions
indicates that when substantial
evidence on the whole record
supports a jury's finding that
the particular
manner of display of
book or picture is
contrary
to the local standards of decency, the verdict
will be upheld.
In effect, Lady Chatterly's
Lover, or Fanny Hill could appear in a college book store or
library, but not in a drug store
frequented by innocent children. The twelve reasonable
men of the jury would decide
obscenity much in the same
manner
they decide negligence. Mr. Clancy suggested
that by misreading the cases,
local authorities
have backed
up from this very reasonable
position and attempted to. apply a nonexistant
"national
standard."
The discussion left the limits of obscenity and the First
Amendment largely undefined.
Yet, by more precisely defining
the issues involved the TMLS
took a step towards some solution to. the problem. While
polishing their armor tor the'
next clash, the members extend thanks to' Mr. Clancy for
his invaluable assistance.
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hopping over to 433 So. Spring, as soon as he finished his
comprehensive
. . . GEORGE is still there and everybody
involved was happy with the move
The way he administered the Loyola Bar Association
ODRA CHANDLER,
'52, was its President in his Senior Year,
it took neither a
prophet nor the son of a prophet to foretell what his particular
interest
would be . . . As Mayor of Anaheim, he
governs in his spare hours, the largest growing community
in Southern
California
and if he could absorb his near
neighbor, Disneyland, there would be no question as to the
accuracy of this reasonable
boast . . . All this he is doing
while he discourses
with discernment
on the "Rule of
Law" ... STEPHEN POWERS, '49, has been doing nobly providing much of the power and lots of light to the Dept. of
Water & Power, ...
no pun intended, ...
just facts, ...
was given a leave of absence, to join the trio appointed by
the Regents of the University
of California
to investigate
how the taxpayers' money is being used to prepare the youth
of today to be the citizens of tomorrow ...
From recent
goings-on up Berkeley way, . . . evidence so far makes it
look like an investment
gone sour ...
RAY ROBERTS, '48,
continues to do the unusual
He landed in the Muncipal
Court via the plebiscite route
Most extraordinary,
...
and one of the very few judges in this area to achieve this
distinction
...
Only a day ago, it seems, he reached the
second plateau in his climb to judicial eminence when he
was robed and inducted into office as a Judge of the Superior
Court ... Another accomplishment
for the record books ...
Well, its just one of RAY'S better habits ... and no matter
at what level of the judiciary he's presiding he'll be always
superior . . . Something new has been added to step up the
effective prosecution
of mail fraud cases, fraud by wire, and
criminal
tax cases . . . This newly created section is referred to as "Criminal
Frauds"
. . . To guarantee
it the
glow of modernity
and to start it out at a highly effective
level, the "something
new" is none other than JO ANN
DUNNE, '60, who has sparkled the U.S. Attorney's
Office
...
Since her graduation
from Law School, ...
the "cum
Iaude'<on
the diploma of MARGARET KELLER, '49, represents the Hallmark of quality ...
"achievement
beyond the
demands of duty ...
" MARGARET came down here from
Ventura and as soon as she was graduated,
hurried back to
her native bailiwick to give it the benefit of her enlightenment . . . She lost no time in establishing
a reputa.tion in
legal circles ...
Skill, understanding,
intelligent
sympathy
and professional
know-how were the ingredients
that went
into her success formula . . . The measure of her accomplishment is pretty well gauged by the fact that only recently
she was elected President of the Ventura County Bar Association and became the first woman so honored in its long and
impressive
history . . . Incidentally,
her election kept the
Presidency in the Loyola Family, for she succeeds ROBERT
W. FAIRBANKS, '53, who was so determined
to become a
lawyer that he left his native Fillmore to study at. Loyola ...
Upon completing
the course, he rushed back home a refined country lawyer, dispensing wisdom and culture to the
rich agricultural
area of Ventura's hinterland
... Just when
JUDGE KAUS, '49, was beginning
to find his way around
the labyrinthine
Courthouse,
and was more or less oriented
as to the situs of his courtroom, ... he was apprised by the
Governor that his services were required at a higher level
of the judiciary
and that he was being appointed
to the
District Court of Appeal ... It happened fast but it couldn't
have happened
to one more competent
and deserving ...
..Not many more plateaus remain before supreme eminence
is attained.
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Phi Alpha Delta Law Fraternity
in it's recognized tradition has announced an outstanding
program of social and
professional
activity for the Spring semester. P.A.D. believes
that a legal fraternity
should serve some positive purpose
in the life of each student member. The organization
should
do it's part in preparing
each neophite lawyer to take his
proper place in the professional community. It is not enough
that the organization
act as nothing more than a clearing
house for frivolity. Each student who enrolls in law school
submits himself to the rigors and discipline required to enter
one of this societies highest recognized callings. One of the
requisites of our great profession is sociability, but another
equally important
and often overlooked is dignity. P.A.D.
addresses itself to the combination of both of these qualities.
We are not unaware of the criticism of this philosophy that
generates both from without our ranks and even on occasion
from within. In fact, we are grateful for these voices of dissension, that we might be ever conscious of our responsibility
to the serious students of this school. The members of P.A.D.
intend
to have a good time and intend to continue to maintain an open door policy to those who wish to affiliate with
and serve in a legal fraternity
with a sense of responsibility.
It is with these thoughts in mind tha.t P.A.D. prepared for
this Spring semester.
On Saturday,
March 27, P.A.D. will host the first Invitational Golf Tournament.
Phi Delta Phi has announced that
they will enter a team in competition
captained
by Jim
Waldorf. Captain for P.A.D. will be Mike Maloney. Individu.al
trophies
will be awarded and a perpetual
plaque will be
established in the school fraternity room.
The Magic Castle, a private club for the magicians'
association, will throw open it's doors for the members of
P.A.D. and their guests on the evening of March 28, 1965. An
exquisite dinner and unusual entertainment
has been planned.
Wednesday, March 31, finds the fraternity
at the famous
Playboy Club for lunch. After-lunch
entertainment
will be
provided by Mr. William Tucker, a fraternity
brother and
member of the faculty.
On Wednesday, April 14, P.A.D. will sponsor the third of
a series of tours and lectures to familiarize the law student
with the governmental
departments
in which he will have
to function in
nal courts arid
crime lab and
bers and their

practice. This time we will emphasize crtrniprocedure. There will be a tour of the sheriff's
the coronor's office. Open to all P.A.D. memguests.

The Annual Initiation
of new members and installation
of new officers will be conducted on Friday, April 23, 1965
in Dept. 12, Los Angeles Superior Court. The ceremony will
be followed by a dinner and the presentation
of awards.
P.A.D. takes pleasure in announcing
another step in a continuing program of service to the school, the profession and
the student. Upon approval of the faculty and administration, Phi Alpha Delta-Ford
Chapter will present an award
consisting of a set of basic practice codes to the first year
student,
both Day and Evening, who achieves the highest
cumulative
average during the first year of study. To be
eligible, the recipient. must also be an active member of
Phi Alpha Delta. The selection will be made by the faculty
members of the Fraternity.
The award will be presented
each year at the beginning of the Fall semester to the winners of the previous years.
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THOU SHALT NOT MERGE:
,THE SUPREMECOURT AND SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
by .Tames.T.WaldO'rf
In a series of recent decisions, the Supreme Court of the
United States has extended the errect of the test "may be
substantially to lessen competition" found in Section 7 of
the Clayton Act to encompass almost any merger or business
combination today. While the Court has not taken the position that any merger is proscribed by the statute, it is a
rare case in which the merger of two companies will not
have some probable effect on future competition to which
Section 7 might be applied. In almost any field of corporate
endeavor, a large business can be operated more efficiently
than a small one. Any businessman is aware that it is often
more expedient to acquire an existing business than to rely
On internal expansion in achieving the growth requirements
of a given enterprise. The task confronting legal counsel in
determining the point at which a client may run the risk
of injunction or judicial divestiture under the anti-trust
laws remains formidable. The outer limits of Section 7 are
by no means clear at this time.

I

use of such stock by the voting or granting of proxies
or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." (15 U.S.C.
#18).
The legislative intention leading to the amendment of
Section 7 was stated in Brown Shoe CO'.v, United States,
370 U.S. 294, 323, 82 S.Ct. 1502,1522 (1962): "Congress used
the words 'may be substantially to lessen competition' (emphasis supplied), to indicate that ilts concern was with probabilities, not certainties. Statutes existed for dealing with
clearcut menaces to competition; no statute was sought
for dealing with ephemeral possibilities. Mergers with a
probable anticompetitive effect were to be proscribed by
the Act."
The first indication of the coming extension of Section 7
was given in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,
374 U.S. 321, 83 S.Ct. 1715 (1963). In that case the Court held
that Section 7 could apply to the merger of the second and
third largest banks in the Philadelphia area notwitnstandtng
the effect of the Bank 'Merger Act of 1960.The Court ignored
strong policy arguments in favor of the merger and concentrated on the anticompetitive effect of the combination.
While the Court made a logical application of Section 7, it
was clear at that point that "may be substantially to lessen
competition" would not be confined to the decision in Brown
Shoe, Brown Shoe CO'.v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 82 S.Ct.
1502 (1962).

The 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendment of Section 7 was
unquestionably intended to plug the weaknesses of Sherman
Act application to merger cases. The original Section 7 was
applicable only to stock acquisition cases, and the merger
solution offered a loophole to companies threatened with
prosecution. See Swift & CO'.v. Federal Trade Commisston,
272 U.S. 554, 47 S.ct. 175 (1926) and Arrow-Hart & Hegeman
Elec. CO'.v. Federal Trade Commission, 291 U.S. 587, 54 S.Ct.
532 (1934). The Sherman Act application to merger cases was
seemingly restrtcted to situations of outright monopoly in
the Cofumbla Steel case, United States v. Columbta Steel CO'., It should be noted that the holding in Brown Shoe con334 U.S. 495, 68 S.Ct. 1107 (1948), although the Court in stituted the basis of the District Court decision refusing apUnited States v. First Nattonal Bank & Trust CO'.,376 U.S. plication of Section 7 in each of the four major cases to be
665, 84 S.ct. 1042 (1964), has indicated that the Cotumbia discussed. In each case, the Supreme Court reversed the
Steel decision "must be confinerl to Its special facts," and District Court and condemned the merger.
that "where merging companies are major competitive facIn United States v. EI Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651,
tors in a relevant market, the elimination of significant com84 S.Ct. 1044 (1964), the Court looked at the probable effect
petition between them, by merger, itself constitutes a violaon future competition rather than the effect on competition
tion of Section 1 of the Sherman Act." 84 S.Ct. at 1037.
which existed at the time of the merger. At the time of the
In spite of the possible extension of the Sherman Act which acquisition of Pacific Northwest, EI Paso was the only out
might be predicated upon the language in the First Na- of state supplier of natural gas. in California. The line of
ttonal Bank case, the more potent weapon of the govern- commerce or relevant product market was properly dement in merger cases has been provided by the Supreme termined to be natural gas; the relevant geographical market
Court under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which reads in was California. It was noted that Pacific Northwest had
made several unsuccessful attempts to get into the Calirelevant part:
fornia market, and that in the natural gas industry, the
initial installation costs are so high that transactions are
"That no corporation engaged in commerce shall
generally few in number and extended over a period of
acquire, directly or indirectly: the whole or any part
. several years. "The competttion then is for the new incre. of the stock or other share capital and no corporation
ments of demand that may emerge with an expanding PO'PUIation and with an expanding industrial or household use
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Com.of gas." 84 S.Ct. at 1049.
mission shall acquire the whole or any part of the
assets of another corporation engaged also in comThe Court justifies its decision on the ground that although
merce, where in any line or commerce in any secPacific Northwest and EI Paso were not competitors at the
time of the acquisition, Pacific Northwest was the foremost
tion of the country, the effect of such acquisition
danger to .eriter the California natural gas market and
may: be substantially to lessen competition, or to
challenge
EI Paso's supremacy. The removal of such danger
. tend to create a monopoly.
by EI Paso cannot be said to lack anticompetitive implications. The nature of competition in the area of natural
"No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
gas, or other utilities for that matter, is such that it is
the whole or any part of the stock or other share
eliminated once a contract is Signed. The nature of a utility
capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction
is such that it cannot operate efficiently without a large,
ready-made market for its product or service. On the other
of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
side, the utility is in the position of a natural monopoly;
.whole or any part of the assets of one or more corpit is more difficult to subject the utility to scrutiny as it
orations engaged in commerce, where in any line
grows larger. Competition, if it is to be maintained at all
of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
in this area, must come initially. For this reason, the eltmiOf such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or the
(Corrrinued on page 4)
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even though Alcoa's increased share of the market would be
only 1.3%.

The difficulty here, and the subject of a vigorous dissent
nation of a major segment of probable future competition
by Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Harlan and Goldberg,
justified the application of Section 7 in this case.
concerned the determination of the relevant lines of comThe El Paso doctrine was extended in a novel fashion in merce by·the majority.
United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158, 84
The aluminum conductor field was broken down into three
S.ct. 1710 (1964). This case involved the formation of a new
corporation on the basis of a joint enterprise undertaken segments: (1) bare aluminum conductor, (2) insulated alumiby Pennsalt Chemicals Corporation and Olin Mathieson num conductor, and (3) the broader field of aluminum conChemical Corporation. The relevant product market was con- ductor, comprised of both bare and insulated aluminum conceded to be sodium chlorate and the geographical market ductor. It was conceded that bare aluminum conductor was
the Southeast sector of the United States. Penrisalt was en- a separate line of commerce. The controversy arose from a
gaged chiefly in the production of chemicals, including sodi- finding by the majority that alminum conductor need not be
um chlorate, which was produced solely at Portland, Oregon. combined with copper conductor as a line of commerce, and
Olin was more diversified, and although engaged in the that aluminum conductor was a distinct line of commerce.
production of chemicals and chemical products, did not proThe dissent notes that, as between the insulated aluminum
duce sodium chlorate. Olin had vast sources of distribution,
conductor and' insulated copper conductor, there is a conincluding the Southeast.
siderable degree of functional interchangeability. The disThe Court. concluded that Section 7 was intended to apply sent also states that neither of these products is recognized
to "joint ventures," on the reasoning that Congress had not as a separate economic entity in the industry. Douglas, for
intended to create what would otherwise be a significant the majority, points out that there is an absence of crossloophole. The Court then concerned itself with the task of elasticity of price between the two products; where insulated
aluminum conductor can be satisfactorily employed, its copfinding a probable substantial lessening of competition.
per counterpart is economically unfeasible. The dissent reThe evidence revealed that Pennsalt had desired to get plies with the statement that numerous economic factors in
into the Southeast market to satisfy the growing need for addition to the cost must be considered.
sodium chlorate in that region. Olin had been desirous of
The majority's position that the bare aluminum conducproducing sodium chlorate, for which it had.a ready market.
The respective desires of the two companies led to the for- tor and insulated aluminum conductor could be grouped tomation of Penn-Olin, whose sole function was the marketing gether to form a relevant line of commerce is even more
of sodium chlorate in the Southeast. It should be noted that untenable. This is justified on the ground that both proprior to formation of the joint enterprise, each company had ducts are used to conduct electricity and both are sold to
been hesitant the Southeast sodium chlorate market alone. electrical utilities. The difficulty with this is that these
qualities have not in any way excluded copper conductor.
The Court held that the emergence of Penn-Olin in the The inescapeable conclusion which one must reach is that
market might have foreclosed the possible future competition in spite of any attempts on the part of the majority to disof Pennsalt and Olin in the Southeast sodium chlorate mar- tinguish the copper conductor from the aluminum conket. In remanding the case to the District Court, the ma- ductor, the insulated aluminum conductor is more nearly
jority made it clear that a finding that both companies akin to the copper conductor than to the bare aluminum
would have entered the market was not necessary. Evidence conductor in determining a relevant line of commerce under
showing that one of the companies would have entered the Section 7.
market in question, while the other remained on the threshThe only explanation for the result in the Alcoa case is
old as a significant potential competitor would satisfy the
that the majority gave vent to what it felt was the clear
prequisites for invocation of Section 7.
intention of Congress in amending Section 7, and then deIn EI_Paso and Penn-Olin, the determination of the line veloped a line of commerce to substantiate this result. Stewcommerce and the geographical market was not disputed. art, in his dissent, made his position on the policy question
Those cases involved situations in which the ultimate fore- equally clear, stating that he felt such a merger merely
closure of competition remained conj ectural. In the follow- constituted a diversification on the part of Alcoa, and as
ing cases, the question will turn on a determination of the such, outside the intended scope of Section 7.
relevant product. and geographical markets, as a basis for
The decision in United States v. Continental Can oe., 378
estimating the probable future effect on competition.
U.S. 441, 84 S. ct. 1738 (1964), left Section 7's "line of comIn the Alcoa case, United States v. Aluminum Co. of merce" test in a state of pure conjecture. The Court here
America, 377 U.S. 271, 84 S.Ct. 1283 (1964), the Supreme disapproved the merger of Continental, the largest proCourt refused to sanction the acquisition of Rome Cable ducer of metal containers, with Hazel-Atlas, the third largest
Corpora tion by Alcoa. Rome was engaged primarily in the producer of glass containers. The geographichl market conmanufacture of copper conductor, with about 10% of its cededly being the United States, the principal issue involved
business in the field of aluminum conductor. Alcoa engaged a determination that the combined metal and glass container industries constituted a "line of commerce."
solely in the manufacture of alminum conductor.
The Court emphasized that the line of commerce evidenced highly concentrated markets, dominated by a few
large companies, served also by a small and diminishing
group of independents. In the year prior to, the merger,
Alcoa led the aluminum conductor producers with 27.8% of
the market; Rome was ninth with 1.3% of the market. The
Court noted that Rome was an aggressive competitor, that
its skills had been proven in the field of insulation, and that
Rome had an active and efficient marketing organization.
The conclusion of the Court is ultimately based upon the
condition of competition in the industry, the position of
Rome as a competitor, and the fact that the ninth leading
producer of aluminum conductor would thereby be eliminated,

Separate lines of commerce were attributed to the metal
container and glass container industries. The difficulty arises
in attempting to correllate the two industries into a broader
and more comprehensive line of commerce. The Court noted
the existence of both interchangeability of use and crosselasticity of demand with regard to both industries. It was
also noted that price was only one of the factors affecting
the cross-elasticity of demand, the cost of changing packaging equipment and consumer demands for a particular
type of container with a given product tending to lower the
cross-elasticity of demand In these industries. As to this, the
Court said:
(Continued on page 5)
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"... though the interchangeability of use may not be
so complete and the cross-elasticity of demand not
so immediate as in the case of most intraindustry
mergers, there is over the long run the kind of customer response to innovation and other competitive
stimuli that brings the competition between these two
industries within Section 7's competition-preserving
proscriptions."
Extensive interindustry competitaon was cited. While the
evidence was not sufficient to lead to a determination of
just what the area of effective competitton between the
metal and glass container industries comprised, the Court is
quite emphatic that it extends well beyond the finding of
the District Court limiting it in terms of end uses to containers for beer.
The Continental Can case is a clear illustration of the importance of a realistic determination of the "line of commerce." In determining the probability of a substantial lessening of competition, the Court looks at the competitive factors which existed immediately prior to the merger or combination. In the Continental Can case, defining the relevant
market to be the metal and glass container industries, it
was found that Continental accounted for 21.9% of the
market, while Hazel-Atlas'was responsible for 3.1% of the
market. As such, Continental ranked second and Hazel-Atlas
ranked sixth. This is the basis for the Court's conclusion
.that the merger would result in a probable substantial
lessening of competition. The percentages in the instant case
would probably be insignificant if the Court had found that
the relevant market consisted of an even broader container
market, including not only metal and glass, but also plastic,
paper, and several other possible types of container. In this
broader line of commerce, the effect on competition here
would probably have been negligible. The instant case is distinguishable from Alcoa on the basis that neither of the
parties to the merger here manufactures the product of the
other party, whereas Rome did engage to some extent in
the production of aluminum conductor.
The only safe conclusion which one can draw from the
recent cases is that the Supreme Court is making a policy
determination to the effect that any merger between corporations of significant size must withstand a very broad application of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
In the EI Paso and Penn-Olin cases, the Court went a step
beyond the certainty theretofore required in finding a probable lessening of substantial competition in the future. In
the Alcoa and Continental Can cases, the Court determines
.the relevant market to be that which conveniently brings the
merger within the ambit of Section 7. In the latter cases,
the proposed merger consisted of absorption by a leader in
one field of an established producer in a complementary
field. In the Penn-Olin case, each of the participating' companies had entered an entirely new segment of competitive
endeavor. It could be argued that the "joirrt enterprise" in
that case tended to increase competition rather than stifle it.

trust Laws took this approach to the considerations to be
made under Section 7:
"This analysis required by Section 7 is no more
beyond the competence of the courts than the Federal Trade Commission. For both, the following market factors may be helpful in determtning the competitive consequences of any particular acquisition.
We do not, of course, imply that all, several, or any
one of these guides may be significant or even relevant in a given case.
"It may be relevant, however, to study: (1) The
character of the acquiring and the acquired company, (2) the characteristics of the markets affected,
(3) immediate changes in the size and competitive
range of the acquiring company and in the adj ustments of other companies operating in the markets
directly affected, and (4) probable long-range differences that the acquisition may make tor companies actually or potentially operating in these markets." A.G.N.C.Report 124-125 (1955).
Allen A. Dobey, Chief of the Antitrust Division's General
Litigation Section has stated that the significance of the
recent cases is that the Supreme Court intends to enforce
Section 7 in accordance with the legislative intent as expressed in the Committee reports and other legislative history. "And that intent is stronger than the language of
Section 7 itself." The legislative history suggests a ban on
the acquisition of any firm of "economic significance." 33
U.S.L.W.2147.
No one can predict with any great certainty the limits to
which the Supreme Court will eventually ascribe to Section
7. Two interesting District Court cases which may prove
noteworthy in the future are United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 233 F.Supp. 475 (U.S.D.C.,E..Wis.,1964) and United
States v, Von's Grocery Co., 233 F.Supp. 976 (U.S.D.C., S.
caur., 1964).
The words of Justice Harlan, dissenting in Continental
Can, (Justice Harlan dissented in each of the recent Section
7 cases), best serve to summarize the status of the law under Section 7 of the Clayton Act as it stands today: "The
Court's spurious market-share analysis should not obscure
the fact that the Court is, in effect, laying down a "per se"
rule that mergers between two large companies in related
industries are presumptively unlawful under Section 7." He
goes on to say: "I have no idea where Section 7 goes from
here, nor will businessmen or the antitrust bar ... Hereafter, however slight (or even nonexistent) the competitive
impact of a merger on any actual market, businessmen rest
uneasy lest the Court create some 'market,' in which the
merger presumptively dampens competition, out of bits and
pieces of real ones."

It would be unfair not to note that the Court in each or
these cases weighed a great many factors in reaching its
Conclusion. It was often emphasized that competitton in the
EASTER
respective industry was in a state of concentrationtn a few
major companies, and that the companies desiring to merge.
had compiled a history of growth through merger. The cases
have abounded in statistical data, which have been omitted
GREETINGS
from our discussion for the most part, all supporting the
contentions of the Court. A hesitancy to accept the validity
of such data cannot be avoided, since statistics are only as
good as the premise upon which they are postulated. The
Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Anti- H:H:H:fIXl-M-J:H:H:H::H)-j~IXl-M-J:H:H:H::H)-j~IXl-M~H:H::H)-j:H:!1IX!-I:H:lM-J:H:H:H::H)-j:H

LOYOLA

Page Six

BAIL

- - A Need

For Reform

By Joseph E. DiLoreto

The bail system in the United States determines whether
an accused person in a criminal proceeding shall be released
or jailed for the interim period between arrest and trial. In
the typical case, the accused is brought by the police before
a magistrate or judge who advises the accused of his rights
and who, in the exercise of his discretion sets the bail in
a monetary amount. The legal theory underlying this procedure is that bail is sufficient to insure the appearance of
the accused at the judicial trial. If he is financially able to
post the bail or hire a bondsman to post it for him he will
be released, if not he must remain in jail until the trial.
Each ear, the freedom of thousands of persons charged with
various crimes hinges on their actual ability to raise the
necessary money to meet the bail. Those who go free do so
not because they are innocent of the charge but because
they can financially afford to purchase their freedom. The
balance who are detained remain in jail not because of their
guilt but simply because they are too poor. The tragedy of
this system is that the indigent accused, who may have come
in contact with the law for the first time must be detained
until the date of trial, while many habitual offenders who
may be more dangerous to the community gain their release through posting bail.
History of Bail in America
The United States Constitution does not specifically grant
a right to bail. The Eighth Amendment states only that
"Excessive bail shall not be required." Prior to the ratification of the Bill of Rights, Congress had provided in the
Judiciary Act of 1789that "upon all arrests in criminal cases,
bail shall be admitted, except where the punishment may
be death." It continued and stated that bail in Capital
Cases would be discretionary depending upon the nature and
circumstances surrounding the crime and the evidence adduced."
~
In the everyday administration of criminal justice in
American courts, the legal rights of the accused to his pretrial freedom depend soley upon the completion of the commercial bail transaction. As early as 1912,the Supreme Court
recognized that the bondsman's interest to produce the body
of the principal in court is impersonal and wholly pecumary."
At the same time the accused's right to bail in noncapital
cases was steadfastly defined, as Justice Jackson pointed out
.in Stock v. Boyle;"
From the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789 . . .
to the present Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
... the Federal law has unequivocally provided that
a person arrested for a non-capital offense shall be
admitted to bail. This traditional right to freedom
before trial permits' the unhampered preparation
of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of
punishment prior to convention ... unless this right
to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of
innocense, secured only after centuries of struggle
would lose its meaning.
'
The American judges' discretion in setting pretrial bail in
noncapital cases has consistently been intrepreted to allow
latitude in setting the amount of bail. This primary proposition was pointed out in Stock v. Boyle:+
The right to release before trial is conditional upon
the accused's giving adequate assurance that he will
stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty ...
Like this ancient practice of securing the oaths of
responsible persons to stand as sureties for the accused, the modern practice of requiring a bail bond
or the deposit of a sum of money subject to forfeiture serves as additional assurance of the presence
of an accused ... Since the function of bail is limited,
the fixing of bail for any individual defendant must
be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of
assuring the presence of the defendant.
It ca~ be then restated, that the development of bail in
the Umted States has for a single purpose the release of
the accused with the assurance he will' return at the date
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of trial. It may not be used to' detain the accused through
the setting of excessive amounts, and its continual validity
when the accused is indigent or otherwise a pauper now may
be drawn into question.
The Cost of Detention.
Those who cannot afford a bondsman generally remain
in jail. Their loss of freedom is based upon no rational
criteria, but upon their inability to raise the cash premium
or to furnish the required collateral. A resolution adopted
by the National Association of Attorneys General on July 3,
1963stated:
Many persons accused of crimes are incarcerated for
various periods of time because of their inability to
post bail, although often not indicted for the crime
or later found not guilty after trial, resulting in loss
of liberty, separation from families and loss of employment as well as expense to the state in the cost
of confinement (and) relief for dependents.
These costs of pretrial imprisonment in the United states,
in terms of time, money, and human suffering are staggering.
In fiscal year 1960, 23,811 persons accused of federal offenses were held in custody pending trial. The average length
of their detention was 25.3 days.' Detention ranged for a
Iowa verage of 2 days in some districts to a high average of 110
days in others.s In 1963those persons detained within federal
confines spent an estimated 600,000jail days in local prisons,
at a cost to the federal government of $2,500,000.In a recent study conducted by the New York Bar Association the
localized cost to selected large .citdes was uncovered. In St.
Louis the average cost of detaining one accused was $2.56
per day, $2.61 in Atlanta, $3,82 in Washington, D.C., $4.25 in
Philadelphia, $4.28 in Chicago, $6.25 in New York and $6,86
in Los Angeles. These figures reflect only the variable costs
such as food, clothing, supervision, and medical care. These
figures in no way reflect the fixed costs,' items' like construotion and maintenance of buildings, a~d the alternative
use the facilities could be put to.
.
. More important than the economic burden on the taxpayers
IS the personal toll upon the detained and his family. His
home may be disrupted, his family humiliated, his relations
with his wife and children unalterably affected. The man
who goes to jail for failure to make bond is treated in almost every case and in every jurisdiction as a convicted
criminal serving a sentence. In the words of Jones V. Bennett, Director of the United States Bureau of Prisons.'
When a poor man is arrested, he goes willy-nilly to
the same institution ,eats the same food and suffers
under the same hardships as he who has been convicted of a crime. The well-to-do, the rich, and the
influential on the other hand find it requires only
money to stay out of jail, at least until they have had
their day in court.
Alternatives to the Bail System.
1. Manhattan Bail Project.
In the fall of 1961,the Vera Foundation's Manhattan Bail
Project pioneered the fact findings process in New York City
by launching a program in conjunction with the Felon Division of the Magistrate Court. Assisted by the Ford Foundation grant of $115,000and staffed by New York University
law students under. the supervision of a. Vera Foundation
director, the project interviewed approximately 30 newly arrested felony defendants each morning prior to arraignment.
The accuseds for the most part were indigents who would
be represented by counsel appointed by the court. The students
obtained information relating to employment, family residence, and prior record. A point system was used to ev~luate
these factors and arrive at a recommendation, For each defendant determined by the project to be a good parole risk,
1. J Stat. 73, 91 (1789);
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
2. Leary v. Untted States, 244 U.S. 567, 575 (1912).
3. 342 U.S. 1,4 (1951).
4. Ibid.
5. Advisory Committee's
Note to Rule 46, Second Preliminary
Draft of Proposed
Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
(1964)
6. Survey of United States Attorneys
(1964);
Attorney General's Committee Report p. 65.
7. Address, February 24, 1939.

(Continued on page 7)
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BAIL- THE NEEDFOR REFORM
PHI DELTA PHI
(Continued from page 6)
a summary of the survey was sent to the court reccomending
"Enthusiasm
is running after the game. There were
parole. If parole was decreed then the project staff remains amok!"
grunts, groans, and screams of
in touch with the defendant and sees that he is reminded
Phi Delta Phi, in its con- foul among a group of apof his obligation to appear in court on the trial date.
cern for academic excellence, proximately 100 students who
Up to date, a total of 2,630persons have been so released. offered a seminar program didn't .reel that they could
Of these only 24 have failed to appear. Thus the efficency that succeeded in probing and field a representative team of
of the system has demonstrated a record of over 99 per cent exploiting the intellectual cap- 5 players. They decided that
appearance at trial. The financial savings to the city in not abilities of its pledges. This was defaulting under these cirhaving to support these persons in jail is substantial; how- not a "one shot deal," but a cumstances was "the better
ever the financial benefit to the individuals themselves and continuous program through- part of valor."
their families in not being kept from gainful employment is out the semester and was well
Approximately 25 PDP men
much greater, and the human benefit to them and their attended and richly rewarding participated in intra squad
families is incalculable.
to the participants.
games that afternoon. Four
2. Release on Recognizance.
During this time the social full teams were formed, and
Once the facts about the accused's community roots are personality of the fr~ternity lay everyone drank beer and playknown, the court is in a positlon to individualize the bail dormant. But it has since ex- ed basketball. Not one PAD
decision. Increasing attention has been given in recent years ploded with a fury that has strayed into the gym that aftto opportunities for the widespread release of defendants left outsiders trembling en- ernoon. This was unfortunate,
on their own recognizance; their promise to appear without viously in its wake. Phi Delta because these people who abany further security. A great many state and federal courts Phi believes, and rightly so, hor physical exercise were dehave long employed this device to allow pretrial freedom that physical fitness is woe- prived of a meal at Scarppofor defendants whom the court or prosecutor personally know fully neglected in law school. lito's that Tom Jones would
to be reliable or "prominent" citizens. But for the past three Students, in their pursuit of have enjoyed; spaghetti, raviyears we have seen the practice extended to many defendants knowledge, engage in all forms oli, pizza and an unlimited
who cannot raise bail. The Manhattan Bail Project has of mental gymnastics, but supply of beer. Even Dick Pidemonstrated that a defendant with roots in the community physical exercise is discarded antadosi was full.
is not likely to flee, irrespective of his lack of prominence as an undesirable infringeThere was a subsequent
or ability to pay a bondsman. To date, these projects have ment on their precious time. feeble attempt from the other
produced remarkable results, with vast numbers released, The fraternity has attempted group that should not go unfew defaulters and scarcely any commissions of crime by, in some small way, to rectify mentioned. PAD tried to
parolees in the interim between release and trial.
this situation by encouraging eradicate the stigma of their
3. Summons in Lieu of Arrest
the participation of both tra- default and shame by chalBy definition, release on recognizance is a device to restore ternities in athletic activities. lenging PDP to a golf tournathe liberty of an accused who has been arrested and brought
There is a triology of sports ment. The fraternity would
before a magistrate. To the extent that such releases can by which the fraternity at- not stoop to engage in a "titbe granted in large numbers and with small risk of default, tempts to effectuate this pur- for-tat" default and decided
they suggest that-in
certain offenses and for appropriate pose:' football, basketball, and to support a representative
defendants-the
arrest process. might be avoided altogether. softball. (Beer vollyball, and team. There was talk of a
To bypass arrest and bail in less serious offenses, extended skimpily clad nymphs of the joint party after the game, touse of the summons or citation has long been urged. Basically, sea will contribute to fur- gether with the presentation
these devices are orders issued by a judge or police officer ther physical stimulation dur- of trophies. Splendid idea, but
to the accused, directing him to appear in court at a desig- ing the summer.) Part two of it was ill timed and too late.
nated time for hearing or trial. Recently the Attorney Gen- this program went into effect The enthusiasm of PDP for
eral's Committee endorsed the summons for "those cases in this semester when Phi Delta mixed parties has been rudely
which an arrest is not required to protect the proper rune- Phi challenged Phi Alpha,Del- snuffed out.
tioning of the criminal process.?s
ta to a basketball game. The
(Editor's note; Golly gee!!
Although approximately 28 states and the federal courts fraternity, in its naive but I bet that taught those dirty
have statutory provisions for judicially issued summons in well-meaning way, thought guys from PAD a lesson).
lieu of warrants, or for police citattonsJn lieu of sight ar- that the activity would be enThe
social
juggernaut
rests, their use is presently limited largely to traffic of- thusiastically received. The re- marches on.
tenses and violations of municipal codes and county ordi- sponse was shocking and frusRealizing the importance of
nances. Yet in a variety of situations involving minor crimes trated any attempt to engage moments of levity in Loyola's
or misdemeariors, estimated to constitute over 90% of all the rival fraternity in a test pressure cooker, the fraternity
American crime, the comparatively small likelihood that the of athletic strength. But most, has sponsored two exchanges,
defendarit will flee suggests little need to invoke the arrest important, both were deprived both have been raucously sueprocess with its consequent reliance on bail.
of the opportunity to mingle
(Continued on page 13)
Conclusion
together in a social setting
'Studies dissecting the bail system have been conducted
for a good many years. Their uniform conclusion is that the
ARTHUR L. KOTlAR
system has not worked in an equitable manner. Accused perSons in large numbers in all parts of the country are forced
Editor In Chief
to spend the interval between arrest and trial in jail. Most
MARTIN J. BLAKE
are detained only because they cannot pay the bondsman'S
premium or put up the collateral he asks. They lose their
Associate Editor"
jobs and their family life is disrupted. Their chances for
RONALDM. COHEN
acquittal are lowered; their opportunities for probation diExecutive Editor
minished; their quest for equal justice handicapped ..
The trouble with the present system is that by relying' on
the false security of money, too many poor are needlessly CONTRIBUTORS: Robert Charbonneau, Joseph Diloreto, John Harris, Warren
Hernand, Frank Myers, Donald Parrish, James Waldorf,
detained; it also protects too little against the dangerous.
Opinions expressed in the Loyola Digest are those of the writers and do not
The recent decisions of the Supreme Court concerning the necessarily
reflect the views of the Loyola Digest, the University,
the law
indigents right to counsel both at the trial and theappelate School or the Student Bar Association.
levels indicate that a man's financial position does not de- Permission is given for reproduction of any part of an article appearing herein,
termine his position of equal protection under the law.
provided, that credit is given to both the loyola Digest and the author of the
article.
8, Attorney General's Committee Report p. 74; Report of the National
mission on law Enforcement and Observance, March 15, 1964.

Com-

Page Eight

LOYOLA

D 0 B A'D 0
In Defense of Dorado
By .John F. Harris
An unusual Petition for Rehearing was filed before the
Supreme Court of California.
This petition, filed September
15, 1964, was exceptional
in
that it was signed by no less
than the California Attorney
General,
three deputies Attorney General, fifty-six District Attorneys, one hundred
ninety-four
Chiefs of Police
and the Sheriffs of thirty-nine
counties. The Supreme Court
was quick to act and on September 24, 1964, granted a rehearing.v
.The case that aroused such
furor among the law enforcement and prosecutional agencies of this state-was People v.
Dorado, 61 A. C. 892, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 264, 329 P.d 952 (1964),
vacated, 62 A.C.-, 42 Cal. Rptr.
169 (1965).
The events leading up to
this furor and ensuing petition
were as follows. Robert B. Dorado, age 26, was serving a life
term in San Quentin Prison
for the sale of marijuana. According to prison officers, they
discovered
on December
12,
1961, the body of Navarez in
the the lower prison yard behind some bleachers. Navarez
died 20 minutes
later from
multiple stab wounds in the
chest. Suffice it to say that all
evidence led directly to Dorado.
_.
Approximately
an
hour
later, between 9:00 and 10:00
A.M., officers brought Dorado,
into the office of Captain
Hocker, and official of San
Quentin Prison. In order to
examine
the defendant
for
superficial cuts and scratches
which might have been inflicted in the fatal skirmish,
Captain Hocker requested defendant to strip to the waist.
After he had dressed, he was
shown a blood stained' jacket
with his name on it found near
the scene of the crime.· He
made no comment.
Captain
Hocker then requested Officer
Glacier to take defendant
to
the
hospital
laboratory
in
order that a technician might
remove and test some brown
flecks on defendant's
hands
which appeared
to be dried
blood. After defendant's
return about an hour later, Mr.
Midyet from the district attorney's office arrived.
Mr. Midyet
and
Captain
;Hq<::~_er
testifled at _the trial
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that early in the afternoon
less that right is intelligently
circumstances the introducin the course of an irrter'roga- waived. In laying down this
tion into evidence of statetion lasting about two hours, rule the court relied heavily
ments obtained from a dedefendant
confessed the kill- on such recent Supreme Court
fendant during police intering. More confessions and in- of the United States' decisions
rogation in violation of his
terrogations
followed in the as: Escobedo v. State of Hliright to counsel and his
next two days.
nois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964);
right to remain silent may
Note that by the time of Massiah v. United States, 377
constitute
harmless
error,
confession eliciting interrogaU. S. 201 (1964); Gideon v.
we are convinced that the
tion, the forces of the state Wainwright,
372 U. S. 335
error is necessarily
prejuhad been marshalled
against
(1963), and Carnley v. Cochdicial when the statements
Dorado.
Investigation
pro- ran, 369 U. S. 506 (1962), The
are conresstons."
ducing evidence of defendant's
Court made clear that any inThe only ray of consolation
guilt had been conducted. De- criminating
statements
elici- for law enforcement
officials
fendant
had
already
been ted from defendant
after in- to come from the California
searched
and
interrogated
vestigation
is focused upon Supreme Court on that day
once. Not only the officer him but before he has been was in a decision in a different
questioned him at the interroclearly
made
aware
of his case, In re Lopez, 62 A.C.-, 42
gation
in which defendant
right to have counsel and to Cal. Rptr. 188 (1965). In a well
ultimately confessed, the dis- remain silent must be exclud- written and reasoned opinion
trict attorney was there too. ed from evidence and failure by Justice Tobriner, the court
The evidence as to what to so exclude will result in, held that the rule extending
methods were used to obtain automatic reversal.
right to counsel to pre indictdefendant's
confession
was
Thus arose the furor and ment interrogation
was not to
highly conflicting.
The trial fear among police and prose- be applied
retroactively
on
court found the confessions to cutors. They screamed "crimi- collateral attack.
be voluntary, admitted
them nal coddling" and "unworkLaw enforcement and proseinto evidence and found de- able rule." When the rehear- cutional
agencies
have atfendant guilty of malicious as- ing was granted, law enforce- tacked the Dorado decision on
sault with a deadly weapon ment sighed and awaited its three
grounds
and compliresulting in a fellow prisoner's
redemption from this tempo- mented it on one. They condeath, a crime for which there rary aberration. When the re- tend:
is an automatic
penalty
of deemer arrived, he was not all I. The decision is not historicdeath." Penal Code Section that could be imagined from ally justified.
1239, sub. (b), provides tor an the prophets' description.
II. The decision is without
automatic appeal.
On January 29, 1965, came American legal precedent.
The
California
Supreme not the redeemer but instead III. The decision will seriously
Court, on August 31, 1964,
Massiah and an Escobedo. impair law enforcement
and
handed down its decision re- 'The court vacated its August handcuff
the police in their
versing the conviction. It ac- opinion and held unequivocalinve,stigations.
cepted the trial court's de- ly as follows:
IV. Then the attackers
sigh,
termination
that the confesWe conclude, then, that the "Well, at least its not retrosions were not coerced. The
defendant's confession could active."
following was enough for the
not properly be introduced
While there is room for inSupreme Court:
into evidence because
(1) telligent difference of opinion,
At the trial Captain HO'2kthe investigation
was no the four premises of the law
er testified that he not only
longer a general inquiry in- enforcement
agencies
are
initially interrogated the deto an unsolved crime but founded on what the writer
fendant but had been preshad begun to focus on a par- believes to be misconceptions.
ent during the major part of
ticular suspect, (2) the sus- The rest of this article is dedefendant's interrogation by
pect was in custody, (3) the voted to support of and commembers of the district atauthorities
had carried out ment on the California
Sutorney's office. He further
a process' or interrogations
preme Court's decision.
testified that he did not at
that lent itself to eliciting
THE DECISION IS
any time inform defendant
incriminating
statements,
HISTORICALLY JUSTIFIED
of his right to counselor of
(and)
(4) the authorities
It is undoubtedly
true, as
his right to remain silent.
had not effectively informed the attackers
contend,
that
He did not hear anyone else
defendant
of his right to the founding fathers at the
so inform the defendant;
counselor
of his absolute adoption of the U. S. Consti. Mr. Midyett testified to the
right to remain silent, and tution
would not have insame ~ffect.3
no evidence establishes that terpreted
the Sixth AmendThe court ruled that once
he had waived his rights:'
ment right to .counsel to exofficers have focused an inThe fact that evidence apart
vestigation upon a particular
from appellant's statements to 1. Cragen, DorCido Revisited-Decision
Hastings
College
of Law
person, they must affirmativethe police almost conclusively Defended,
(Hastings),
Nov. 30, 1964, p, 5, col. 1,
ly advise him of his right to estabilished his guilt was held 2, Cal. Penal Code Section 4500.
counsel and of his right to re- not to alter this result.
3. People o, D01'ddo, 61 A.C 892, 894,
Finally, we cannot dispose 40 Citl. Rptr. 264, 265 (1964) (opinmain silent. The court further
of the introduction
of the ion vacted).
declared that his constitutionillegally obtained confession 4, People v. Dorado, 62 A.C ---,
al right to counsel' precludes
42 Cay. Rptr. 169, 179 (1965).
the use of incriminating
stateupon the ground that is 5. u. at 180-181.
ments elicited by police during
constituted merely harmless
(Continued on page 10)
accusatory
investigation
unerror. Although under some
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DEBATED

Dissent From Dorado
By Donald Parrish

asked to see his attorney, who
at that moment was at the
police desk requesting that he
be permitted
to speak to his
client. It was not until questioning of Escobedo had ended
and he had admitted complierty in his brother-in-taw's
slaying, that he was allowed to
consult his lawyer, Because
the lawyer had previously told
him not to make a any statement,
Escobedo's
confession
was ruled voluntary
He was
sentenced to 20 years' for firstdegree murder.
Ona
eal to
.
pp
0 the
Umted
States
Court ,an the
'.
. Supreme
convictton was reversed in a
5-4 decisio
Th
iortt
. 1 n.
e majori Y held
that ...'"where as h ere, th' e investtgation
.
. IS , no longer a general inquiry mto an unsolved
crime but h
besr
t f
,
. as egun 0 ocus
on a partIcular
suspect, the
suspect has been taken into

no statement
elicited by the
police during the interrogation
may be used against him at a
criminal trial." The court went
on to say "it would exalt form
over substance
to make the
right to counsel, under these
circumstances,
depend
on
whether
at the time of the
interrogation,
the authorities
had secured a formal indictment."

The case of PEOPLE V. DORADO, 62 A.C. 350, decided by
our State Supreme Court last
January, has b~en termed one
o~ . the .most important
deCISIOl~S in the .crImma~
law
area m recent times. Prior to
DORADO, one accused of a
crime had the right to an attorney
under
the
United
In DORADO, the defendant
States Constitution
from the
had appealed from a judgemoment of his indictment. Bement of conviction for murder,
fore formal indictment, police
and a death penalty. Dorado
officials could qeustion a suswas serving a life sentence in
.. private. They were
S
Q uen tiin P'rison for sellmg
.
pect m
.,
.
"
I
D
b
f
under no obligation to mform
marijuana.
' n ' ecem er 0
the suspect of his Constitu1961 one Nevarez, a fellow intional right to counsel until
mate, was found stabbed to
.,
d ea th in
i thee prison
nrl
the interrogation
was over and,
yar. d U pa
. di ttl
d d Ad
on investigation,
officers disn In IC men
0 ge.
,missions of guilt prior to incovered a blood-stained
blue
dictment
were admissible
in
denim jacket with the prison
evidence as long as the adidentification
number cut out,
mission was a voluntary one. I
but the name "Dorado" was on
Under DORADO, the right to I
the pocket. The officers 10counsel now matures
at the
cated the defendant in his cell,
"accusatory
stage" of the po- '
and under a stack of clothing
lice investigation,
which may
they found the defendant's
or may not precede the indictbloodsatined
trousers. On the
merit, A defendant
has a
defendant's
hands were brown
Constitutional
right to an atflecks, the dried blood of the
torney and must be informed
inmate Dorado had stabbed to
of this right at the moment
death. Later, an accomplice of
"the investigation
is no longer
Dorado admitted he held Nea general inquiry into an unvarez while Dorado time and
solved crime, but has begun to
again stabbed Nevarez in the
focus on this particular
susstomach and chest.
pect."
Any
incriminating
Dorado was brought to the
statements
made by the deoffice of an official of San
fendant, whether voluntary or
Quentin, and questioned connot, during the accusatory stage
cerning
the crime. The deof the investigation,
where
fendant was shown the bloodthe accused was not informed
stained jacket which bore his
of his right to counsel, are to
name, and when told that
be inadmissible
at the deNevarez was dead, the defendant's
trial. A confession
fendant
wept. Dorado then
under such circumstances
is
freely admitted
his guilt bea confession acquired in violafore he had been formally intion of the defendan's Constidicted.
t.utional right to an attorney.
The trial found that the
The Dorado opinion relied
ROBERT B. DORADO,
confession
of the defendant
heavily
upon
the
recent
center of legal storm.
was not coerced. On appeal,
United states Supreme Court.
the supreme
court
of this
dectsion
of ESCOBEDO
V. .pollce custody, the police carry state in a 6-3 decision acILLINOIS, 378 U.S. 478. Danny out a process of interrogation
cepted this finding, but neverEscobedo, a 20-year-old Mexi- that lends itself to eliciting theless overturned
the concan laborer, was arrested
in incriminating
statements,
the ,viction relying on the ESCO1960 in connection
with the suspect
has requested
arid BEDO case,
murder of his brother-in-law.
been denied an opportunity to
Prior to the defendant's
adWithin 12 hours of his arrest
consult with his lawyer and missions of guilt, Dorado was
Escobedo had been released the police have not effecbyely
not warned of his constitupersuant to a writ of habeas warned him of his absolute tional right to remain silent,
Corpus obtained by Escobedo's constitutional
right to remain and of his right to counsel.
lawyer. He had made no in- silent, the accused has been When Dorado was first quescriminating
statements
to the denied
the
'Assistance
of tioned,
"the
investigation
Police.
Counsel' in violation of the ceased to be a general inquiry
Over one week after his re- Sixth
Amendment
to the into an unsolved crime and
lease, Escobedo was again ar- Constitution
as made obliga- had begun to focus on the
rested and questioned. While tory upon the States by the defendant." It was at this time
being
questioned
Escobedo, Fourteenth
Amendment,
.arid] Dorado's
onstitutional
rtghts
I'

matured.
At the commencement of the interrogation
the
accusatory stage of the investigation had been reached.
In failing to inform Dorado
of his Constitutional
right to
an attorney and of his right
to remain silent, the Court
said admissions of the defendant as to his guilt and the defendant's account' of the crime
should not have been admitted
into evidence.
Under
these
circumstances,
"the prosecution cannot
introduce
into
evidence defendant's
own incriminating
words." If they
are so used, the result is a
denial of due process' under
the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, and a new trial must .be
granted
regardless
of the
other evidence of guilt. Improperly introducting
incriminating statements
of the defendant, obtained in violation
of his Constitutional
right to
counsel by failing to inform
the accused of this right prior
to his admission of guilt, trangresses the protection
of due
process no less than illegally
introducing
a coerced confession. In either case, the
Court said, appeUate
courts
cannot inquire into the prejudicial nature of introducing an
illegally obtained
confession.
Guilty or not, the defendant
must be given a new trial.
Until the rule of DORADO
and
ESCOBEDO
has
been
more fully defined
in the
courts,
precisely
what
"accusatory stage" of the investigation means must be left
somewhat
to
speculation.
Many writers fear that the
rule is very broad, and may
result
in a Constitutional
duty imposed upon law enforcement
officials to inform
a suspect of his right to an
attorney and his right to remain silent long before the
actual arrest and interrogation. As analyzed by Attorney
General of this state, the rule
will of necessity do away with
undercover
agents who now
form a vital part of every
large city police force. Justtce
White observes in his dissent
to ESCOBEDO that the rule
is "wholly unworkable and impossible to administer
unless
police cars ate equipped with
:[j'Ublic defenders
and under(Continued

on page 12)
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the rights of the defendant by
complainant's
overzealous investigation could be remedied
in a civil tort action, the
courts did not find it necessary
to scrutinize the methods by
which evidence was obtained
or to regulate the investigation of crime.
"It was not until the second
quarter of the 19th century
that a modern police torce
arose charged with the investigatlon
of crime in the
name or the state."!

tend to preindictment
interrogation. There is a reason ror
this. Police Investigatron, at
least as we know it today,
was not then existent.
It may surprise those who
seldom drive a mile without
seeing a policeman, but there
were virtually no police in the
colonies. Indeed, of the original thirteen states, not one is
known to have had a police
force and only a few had
prosecutors.
The towns and
Thus, say htstorians,"
in
cities did have constables and 18th century criminal process,
magistrates,
but these were the trial marked
the first
mostly old men taking advan- critical point of conrrontatton
tage of an elder day version of between the marshalled forces
the Great, Society pension. of the state and the accused.
Constables
and
magistrates
A man's liberty was usually
seldom made arrests
except truly won Dr lost at his trial.
pursuant to the fresh pursuit Today, criminal trials often
by private citizens after a hue seem like little more than an
and cry. They had almost no appeal from the police interroinvestigative
PDWer and were gation.
subject to suit for false arrest
if they made a mistake.
In the former setting ·the
The investigation
of crimes framers
of our constrtution
committed
outside the pres- lavished a dozen specific proence of witnesses was at best visions on the conduct of trial.
a haphazard
and casual pro- In short, the framers were decess. A person who suspected termined
to see that trials
a particular
man of a crime were conducted with the utcould if he was that inter- most fairness.
ested; privately conduct an investigation, using private inToday, the point of confronvestigators
and
orrering
a tation has been pushed back
usually privately donated re- from the trial to the police
ward. Having assembled the station or before. Thus, Doevidence, he would present it rado was int-errogated without
himself before a grand jury friend or counsel, in secret,
which might return an indict- and not before a jury of his
ment. Even if an indictment
peers. The officers and the
was returned
and an arrest district attorney
elicited the
made, our industrious private admissions. The investigation
citizen often continued to' play had already focused, and at
a maj or role in the prosecu- that point of focus, the state's
tion. Frequently,
the private forces were amassed against
complainant
was allowed to the accused. The writer's prechoose the attorney he wished mise is that had the framers
to act as prosecutor. He could drawn
up the constitution
choose the state or county with police force investigaprosecutor if there was one, Or tions and interrogations
in
he could and often did choose mind, the framers themselves
a private attorney in whom he might have specifically prohe had confidence. This prac- vided rights for the defendant
tice was common here in Los at what is now the critical
Angeles well into the first stage of the criminal process.
quarter of this century." When In spirit they did so provide."
a public prosecutor was used.
he was looked upon primarily
THE DECISION IS AMPLY
as representing
the private SUPPORTED BY AMERICAN
claimant in the name of the
JUDICIAL PRECEDENT:
state. Hence, the famous movie
In Gideon v. Wainwright,
line
"I'll
withdraw
the 372 U. S. 335,341 (1963), the
cha~ges." Today, the district court held the right to counsel
attorney answers, "I'm sorry, to be one of "those guarantees
it's out of your hands. It is of the Bill of Rights which are
the People of the State of I fundamental
safeguards
of
California who are prosecuting
liberty immune from federal
this action."
abridgement
by virtue of the
In the early days of our Sixth Amendment and equally
nation, since both the com- protected
against
state
inplain ant and the defendant
vasion by the Due Process
were looked upon as private Clause
of the
Fourteenth
parties and the violation of Amendment."
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Finally, we must recognize
that the imposition of the
requirement for the request
would discriminate
against
the defendant who does not
know his rights. The defendant who does not ask for
counsel is the very defendant who most needs counsel.
We cannot penalize a defendant
who, not understanding his constrtuttonal
rights, does not make the
formal request and by such
failure
demonstrates
his
helplessness. To require the
request would be to favor
the defendant whose sophistication or status had fortuitously prompted him to
make it.

Escobedo v. State of Illinois,
78 U. S. 478 (1964), was simply
an application of the Gideon
rule
to the
pre indictment
stage of the criminal process,
The u:nited States Supreme
Court held that "where, as
here, the Investigation
is no
longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect, the suspect has been
taken into police custody, the
police carry out a process or
interrogations
that lend itself
to
eliciting
incriminating
statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an
opoprtunity
to consult with
his lawyer and the police have
not effectively warned him of
his
absolute
constitutional
right to remain silent, the accused has been denied 'the
Assistance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amendment
to the Constitution
as 'made
obligatory upon the States. by
the Fourteenth
Amendment:
Gideon v. Wainwright,
372
U. S., at 342, 83 S. Ct., at 795,
and that no statement elicited
by the police during the interrogation may be used against
him a t a criminal
trial."
Escobedo v. State of Illinois,
378 U. S. 478, 490-491.) In its
conclusion the court stated:
We hold only that when the
process shifts from the investigatory
to accusatory
when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to
elicit a confession
our
adversary
system begins to
operate and under the circumstances here, the accused must
be permitted to consult with
his attorney. (Id. at p. 492.)"
The facts of the Dorado
case 10 bring' it squarely within the Escobedo rule except
that Dorado did not retain or
request counsel. The question
then in Dorado was whether
the failure of the accused to
retain or request counsel justifies the application of a rule
different from that of Escobedo. The court in deciding Escobedo relied a great deal on. the
language of the case of Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506,
513 (1962):" ...
it is settled
that where the assistance of
counsel
is a constitutional
requisite, the right to be furnished counsel does not depend on a request." The court
in Carnley added that "requesting counsel" is a "formality upon which ...
his
right may not be made to' depend." (Id. at 514.)
Having discussed the foregoing, the California Supreme
Court in Dorado!l went on to
say:

It is interesting
to observe
that two DUt of the three dissenting justices agreed with
the above statement. Thus, it
is clear that the Dorado decision is not only supported
but is demanded by the recent
United States' Supreme Court
decisions. By applying the rule
announced in Carnley v. Cochran, we obviate the only distinction separating
the facts
in Escobedo from those in
Dorado. THE DECISION WILL
NOT
SERIOUSLY
IMPAIR
LAW
ENFORCEMENT
OR
HANDCUFF THE POLICE IN
THEIR INVESTIGATIONS:
It would be presumptuous
if
not absurd to say that the job
of law enforcement will not be
made somewhat more difficult
by the Dorado decision. But
the rule of Escobedo and Dorado has been tested
and
found workable. It is simply a
change in keeping with our
times. Due Process has always
meant fairness, but our concepts of what is or is not fair
are constantly
changing. As
Chief Justice
Weintraub
so
aptly stated in State v. Smith,
37 N. J. 481, 181 A.2d 761, 762
(1962):

Concepts of justice change.
Doctrines, incomprehensible
today,
were
once
embraced by judges who in
6.
7.
to
73
8.

St. Johns, Final Verdict 92 . (1962).
An Historical Argument for the Right
Counsel During Police Tnt erro gation,
Yale L.]. 1000, 1034 (1964).
Id. at 1041.
9. The writers historical argument is
largely
based on the excellent
article
cited in note 7, supra.
10. People v. DOl'ado, 62 A.C. ---,
42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 175 (1965).
11. Id. at 177-178; see also: Escobedo
v. Stale of Illinois,
378 U.S. 478, 490
(1964);
the concurring opinion of justice Traynor
in People v. Garner, 57
Cal. 2d 135, 165, 18 Cal. Rptr. 40,
58 (1961).
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(Continued from page 10)
their times were doubtless
the epitome of the reasonable man. Surely this is so in
long-range retrospect. It is
equally true that at the
moment
of change
the
choice is not necessarily between dead right and dead
wrong. The judicial scene
is studded with issues upon
which
conflicting
views
command respectable support. When a court alters its
course, it is often but a
preference, a belief that justice is better served in another way, with no intimation that whoever disagrees
must be mean or inane.
Thus the majority of justices on the Supreme Court
have decided that fairness to
the accused today demands
that he have the right to
counsel at pre indictment interrogation. The court is not
oblivious to the fact that this
will create an added burden
for police and prosecutorial
agencies. It simply decides
that this burden is justified
When balanced
against
the
rights
of an accused who
might otherwise be made to
stand without a buffer between him and the marshalled
forces of the state.
The United States Supreme
Court performed the balancing
test and the California court
Was forced to follow suit.
Others had adopted the same
standards prior to the rendition of these decisions and
SUffered no serious impediments to law enforcement. The
same policy was adopted in
England in 1912 with the passage of the famous Judges'
Rules. These rules provided
that the police could not interrogatean
accused and that
on arrest they had to warn
him that any statement
he
made might be used against
him.12 In this country, the
FBI has followed the practice
of informing an arrested person of his rights to counsel
and to remain silent at the
outset of an interview." The
Uniform Code of Military Justice provides that no suspect
may be interrogated
without
first being warned of his right
to make a statement and that
his statement
may be used
against
him.>
The United
StJates Court of Military apPeals has reversed at least two
Convictions on the ground that
the suspect was denied the
right to counsel during an investrgatory interrogation
be-
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stage, sought to eliminate
at the earliest possible moconditions which invited coment, needs someone working
erced confessions, the ruling
wondered how often a police
does not require a retroacin his behalf in order to have
tive application. Second, new
a thorough
investigation
of
interpretations
of constituhis innocence.
It can
be
tional rights have been, and
investigator
is really
out
should be, applied retroacsearching for evidence of intively only in those situnocence. Early investigation
ations in which such new
is as much the key to crimirules protect the innocent
nal acquital as it is to crimidefendant against the possinal conviction.
Who knows
bility of conviction
of a
what evidence of innocence
crime he did not commit;
has slipped away while the defendant lay helpless in jail? I the fact that deefndant was
denied counsel under EscoPerhaps, by not seeing that
bedo does not affect the isthere is a true adversary worksue of guilt. Third, an absoing for the deefndant at the
lute rule of retroactivity as
earliest possible moment, the
to interpretations
of constiprosecution makes a fair trial
tutional
rights which enimpossible. The California Suvisage the correction of fupreme Court may render such
ture practices would impair
a holding in the near tuture.ie
Experience,
then,
teaches
the. administration of crimiThe rule has reason which
that
the
law enforcement
nal law and ultimately rejustifies the increased burden
sult in constitutional rigidagencies who have made an on law enforcement agencies.
effort to operate within the Far from handcuffing the poity. (rd. at 191.)
rule have not been rendered lice, it may unfetter the acineffective.
The California court, in this
cused to meet his monumental
While the courts seldom pose burden of withstanding
the writer's
opinion, stands
on
the argument, it seems that marshalled
forces
of
the shaky ground when it purports to have exploded the
denial
of counsel
at the state.
"splendid myth" of Blackstone
earliest accusatory stage has
RETROACTIVE??
that
all constitutional
inlong rendered the defendant's
The reader
may take a terpretations
are eternal veriinvestigation
ineffective. The
argument could be made that moment to ponder over the ties that stretch backwards
and
forwards
to
infinity.
the main reason for excluding legal validity of the attackers
statement that the one glim- While the court's refusal to
from evidence investigatory
results gathered before the op- mer of reason in' the Dorado apply the decision retroactiveportunity
to consult
with decision is the court's refusal ly may be eminently reasoncounsel, is not to prevent the to apply the decision retro- able and warranted in view of
attack. the serious consequences that
truth from slipping out. On actively on collateral
In In Re Lopez, 62 A.C.-, 42 would flow from the opposite
the other hand, the defendant,
Cal. Rptr. 188, 190 (1965), Jus- decision, it presents real conif we indulge the presumption
of his innocence, may well tice Tobriner writing for a stitutional problems. The ashas always been
unanimous
court stated the sumption
ha ve an interest in gathering
never
evidence of the truth in order decision and gave his reasons that the constitution
changes. We may suddenly
to establish his innocence. It as follows:
discover that what has gone
is well known that evidence of
Whether or not Lopez's in- on for years is unconstItutioninnocence may be as rleeting
criminating statements were al, but we assume that it was
as the evidence of guilt that
improperly
admitted
into always unconstitutional
and
prosecutors
are in such a
evidence under either Mas- just never brought to light. If
hurry to uncover. Even in the
siah or under Escobedo and
simplest drunk driving case, a
Dorado, we hold that Mastwo hour denial of the right
siah may not serve as the 12. See Williams, Police 1Ilte1'fogat~01l
to counsel may exclude the
basis for collateral
attack Privileges and Limitations Under Fareign
possibility
of' an
accurate
upon
judgments
which Laui: England, 52 Crim. L.C & P.S.
blood test which could prove
50 (1958).
"
'
,
have become final before 13.
innocence. Fingerprints
probHoover, J. Edgar, CIvil Liberties
the date upon which the and Lata Enforcement: The Role of the
ably vanish as quickly whether
United
States
Supreme F.B.!. 37 Iowa 1. Rev. 175, 182,
it is the accused or prosecuCourt rendered
that
de- (1952), also Report of the Presidents
tion who does the searching.
Commission
on the As sessinetion
of
cision, nor may Escobedo or President
It is a fact that many crimiKennedy,
619,
612,
625
Dorado be applied to cases (1964).
nals come from the most
which have become final 14. 10 U.S.CA. Section 831 (b).
transient segment of our soprior to the date that the 15, Assembly Corn., on Criminal Pl~Ociety where witnesses can slip
United
. States
Supreme cedure, San Francisco, July 21, 1964 at
away that might have proven
pp 15-16.
. .
Court rendered the Escobedo 16, For intimation that such a deCISIOn
an alibi true. There are no
is in the offing. see: People v. Hall,
decision.
statistics
on how many de61 A,C --,41
Cal. Rptr. 169 (1964),
fendants have gone to prison
We reach this conclusion especially footnote 8 at p. 289, Largely
because the jury didn't believe
due to one sided investigation
by poupon the basis of the three lice, this is the first criminal convicthe "missing witness story."
following propositions . . .: tion reversed by the California Supreme
First, although the United Court in 33 years. See also: In re
If we persist in maintainImbler, 60 Cal. 2d 554, 567, 35 Cal.
States
Supreme
Court in Rptr.
ing a strict adversary system
293, (1963)
People v. Kiiboa,
Escobedo, by providing
a 53 Cal. 2d 748, 752-754, 3 Cal. Rptr.
of criminal
process
where
suspect
with
an
opportunity
prosecutors
are out to win.]
1 (1960),
to obtain the protection of
then there ought truly to be
(Continued on page 12)
an adversary. The defendant, I counsel at the accusatory
fore his right to counsel had
accrued and before charges
had been filed. (United States
v. Rose, 24 C.M.R. 251 (1957);
United States v, Gunnels, 23
C.M.R. 354 (1957.) It is difficult to imagine a charge that
our U. S. Military or our F.B.!.
are inefficient in their operations or hamstrung by having
to work within these rules.
The system has proved not unduly restrictive here in California. According tOoJohn Ne[edly,
District
Attorney
of
Contra Costa County, police
officers have advised suspects
of their right to counsel at the
moment the police intended
to arrest and felt that they
had sufficient facts to justify
the arrest=
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the Supreme Court now suddenly drops this position, will it
nat have :to admit to changing
the canstitution and thus admit to legislating?
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peal. The law does not require
useless acts and objections at
trial before these recent cases
would surely have been useless.
It would probably not only
have been unavailing but actually prejudicial to' a defendant's cause to' raise objections that he knew faredoomed to' be overruled. Perhaps Dorado will provide the
setting far the United States
Supreme Caurt to air these
unanswered questions.

There is no easy solution.
The writer, despite diligent
search, has nat been able to
unearth a single decision in
which the United States Supreme Caurt has failed to
retroactively apply a rule O'f Speaking of Dorado as the
constitutional due process in setting in which rules will be
a criminal case. Indeed, just changed, it is surely only a
the opposite has been true. matter of time until California
Without discussion, the Su- Penal Code Section 851.5 is depreme Court has applied retro- clared unconstitutional. This
actively on collateral attack statute presently provides that
its decisions requiring proced- an accused may be interroural fairness at criminal pro- gated far three hours before,
ceedings that vindicated an he is allowed to telephone his
indigent's right to counsel at attorney. The rule is not contriap1 and on appeal-s that sistent
with
F'ourteenth
guaranteed an indigent's right Amendment Due Process as it
to a transcript of the t1'ia1,'"9
is now interpreted.
and that imposed more strinIn conclusion ,while there is
gent standards tor determining the voluntarlness of con- roam for intelligent disagreeressions.sv It is true that there ment, the California, Supreme
are a host of lower federal Court had ample historieal
court and upper state court justificatian and legal prececases in which retroactivity dent for the Dorado decision.
has been dented=. These, how- The burden upon prosecutortal
ever well reasoned, decisions, and police agencies is warrando not bind the Supreme ted when balanced against the
needs and rights of the acCaurt.
cused. The palice can and
PrO'fessor Freund, in an must learn to operate effecotherwise excellent articleP tively and at the same time inpurparts to cite O'neSupreme form the accused O'fhis constiCourt criminal case denying tutional rights to consult with
retroactive application, but caunsel and to remain silent.
that may be easily dismissed
as not in point. That case, The ruling will work changes
James- v. United States, 336 in the laws 0'f Califarnia and
U. S. 213 (1961) was a tax; prabably man other jurisdicevasion prasecution f0'r failure ·tians. Whether 0'1' not the deto' report embezzeled funds as
'
incame. The cO'urt had previ- cision must be applied on calously held that such ill-gotten .lateral attack, remains one af
gain was not income.23 The the legal ponderables of the
caurt overruled its former Darado decisian which may
holding but dismissed James' and shauld receive U. S. Suindictment saying his evasion preme Caurt clarificatian.
was not "willful" within the
meaning af the applicable Internal Revenue Cade Sectian.
Doughty
v. Maxwell,
376 U.S. 202
The case in no way invO'lved 17.
(1964)
per
curiam;
Pickelsimer
v,
a questian af due pracess and Wainwright,
375 U.S. 2 (1963)
per
curiam; LaVallee
v. Durocker,
377 U.
so is readily distinguishable.
Thus, thase who caunt on a
nan-retraactive application of
the rule that police must affirmatively advise an accused
of his constitutianal rights,
may be surprised b a Supreme
Court which has long lived an
the premise that it merely
interprets and daes not amend
the constitutian. Surely the
court will not refuse retroactive
applicatian simply because the
defendant did not 0'bject at
trial or raise the point an ap-

S. 998 (1964).
18. Smitb
v. CfOuse, 378 U,S. 584
(1964)
p'er ctt1'iam; Ruark
v. State
Colorado,
378 U,S. 585 (1964)
per
curlam.
19, Eskridge v. Jr'ashingtolZ State Board
of Prison Terms, 357 U.S. 214 (1958);
but see Norvell v, State of Illinois, 373
U.S. 420 (1963).
"?O; f!.eck v, Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
21. For a listing of such cases see; In
re Lopez, 62 A,C.--, 42 Cal. Rptr.
188, 195, n. 14 (1965).
22, Freund, New Vistas in Constitution·
al Law, 712 U. Pa. L. Rev. 631 (1964).
23. Commissioner
v, Wilcox,
327 U.S.
404 (1964).
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were presented to the jury
through the agent's testimony.
Reversing
the
conviction,
cover agents and have defense the Supreme Court, held that
counsel at their side.
.the defendant had been deUnder this new approach one nied his Canstitutianal right
might just as well argue that to the assistance of counsel.
a potential
defendant
is It was improper tor the trial
constitutionally entitled to a court to' admit into evidence
lawyer before, not arter, he the defendant's incriminating
commits a crime, since it is statements elicited trom the
then that the crucial incrimi- conversation. The agents innating evidence is put within fringed upan the defendant's
the reach of the government." Constitutional rights in failIt appears that under the new ing to' forewarn the defendant,
rule an undercover agent at- as a Canstitutianal prerequitempting to gather evidence site to' overhearing the inon one particular suspect has criminating conversation, that
reached the point where "the he had a right to summon an
Investigation is no longer a attorney, and a right to regeneral inquiry into an un- main silent.
salved crime, but has begun
Beyond undercover agents,
to focus on this particular' the ESCOBEDOand DORADO
suspect." These words were rational has reached dawn as
used by the Court in DORADO far as traffic offenses. In a
to define when the "accusa- traffic court case in Provitory stage" has been reached. dence, the defendant's car·
At this point the undercover collided in a downtown interagent, in order to comply with section with an innocent
his new Constitutional burden, motorist. A policeman asked
must inform the suspect that the defendant if he had
from hence forth everything stopped before proceeding
the suspect says might be used with caution past a flashing
against him, and that he has red trafic light. When the dea right to a vlawyer and a fendant said no, the policeright to remain silent. If the 'man issued an orr-the-spot
undercover agent fans to"thus ticket summons. Because the
inform the criminal or his officer had failed to warn the
rights under the Constitution, defendant that he did not
incriminating statements to have to' answer, and could canthe agent ar to' any police in- suIt a lawyer, the defendant
former made in the caurse of was released. The defendant's
a canversation with the sus- hanest and frank admissian of
pect will be inadmisible in a guilt was inadmissble evilater trial.
dence.
The far reaching results af
Daes this sound as thaugh ESCOBEDOand DORADOapthe new rule were being pear to be by design rather
carried to' an unreasanable than
by accident. Justice
extreme? Indeed it may, but White, in his dissent tOiESCOthis is the extreme that the BEDO, says: "The decision is
caurts are reaching in apply- thus another majar step in
ing the rule. In MASSIAH V. the directian of the goal which
UNITED STATES,377U.S. 201, the Court seemingly ,has in
the United States, Supreme mind-to bar from evidence all
Court applied the ESCOBEDO admissians obtained fram an
rational to' reverse the can- individual suspected O'fcrime,
victian of a narcotic peddler. whether invaluntarily made 0'.1'
It was held that· the prase- nO't, Until now there simply
cution cannot introduce intO' has been no right guaranteed
evidence the defendant's "awn by the Federal CO'nstitution to
incriminating wards", which be free fram the use at trial
federal agents had deliberately of a valuntary admission made
elicited fram him "in the prior to' indictment," The Fifth
absence O'fhis attarney." After Admendment to the Constituthe defendant's release on tion
provided
prO'tection
bail, a federal agent arranged against the use 0'f an invO'lunwith one CalsO'n,whO'had been tary admission, elicited by the
jaintly indicted with the de- police at any time, but it went
fendant, for the installation in no further.
Calsan's car af a radio transNow the Caurt, to' attain
niittel'. This device enabled this end result, had expanded
the agent, through a receiving the provisian for caunsel in
selt in a car parked nearby, to' the Sixth Amendment to in
listen to' Colson's conversatian effect supercede the self-inwith the defendant. Incrimi- criminatian pl'Ovision af the
nating statements O'fthe de- Fifth Amendment. The Fifth
fendant, recarded fram the
canversatian in Colsan's car,
(Continued on page 13)
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In DORADO, Justice McComb in his dissent points out
that there was "no doubt of
the guilt of the defendant and
that he was not prejudiced by
not being advised of his right
to counsel." The evidence of
his guilt aside from his incriminating
admission
was
overwhelming. Yet the majority reversed
his conviction,
stating that the use of incriminating
statements
given
in violation of the right to the
accused to an attorney
results in a denial of due process and requires a reversal
regardless of other evidence of
guilt. The majority
stressed
the severity of the death penalty, but failed to mention
that it is just as, serious a responsibility
to. nullify
and
make void a jury finding that
Dorado was guilty of murder
in the first degree and should
be punished by execution in
the gas chamber.

Amendment addresses itself to
the very issue here in controversy, use of the defendant's
incriminating
statements
in
trial, and resolves the issue
by proscribing only compelled
statements.
As Justice White
says: "Neither the Framers,
the Constitutional language, a
century of decisions of this
Court nor Professor Wigmore
provided an iota of support for
the idea that an accused has
an
absolute
Constitutional
right not to answer even in
the absence of compulsion-the
Constitutional right not to incriminate himself by making
voluntary disclosures, Today's
decision cannot
be squared
with other provisions of the
Constitution
which, in my
view, define the system of
criminal justice this Court is
empowered to administer." It
would seem once again, the
Court is no longer satisfied
with the mere administration
of the law. It continues. to
legislate it.
In order to support its decision in DORADO, the Court
said that it would be putting
form over substance to' "make
the right to counsel depend
on whether
the authorities
had secured a formal indictment." But could it not be
argued that perhaps the right
to counsel in and of itself is
the form, while the substance
of our judicial system is to determine
if a man is truly
guilty of a crime against snciety, and if he is, to punish
him. The formal objective of
the Courts in DORADO and
ESCOBEDO is to place upon
law enforcement officials the
Constitutional
burden of advising a suspect of his right to
remain silent and right to an
attorney.
This
forewarning
must precede any and all incriminating
statements
made
by the accused, including ~ny
incriminating
conversation
that a police officer or informer may overhear whether
by accident or by design.

PEOPLE V. ANDERSON, 62
C. A. ---,
decided by our
State Supreme Court the same
day DORADO was decided, reversed the conviction a.f the
defendant
who had brutally
stabbed a 13 year old girl because she had refused to have
sexual intercourse
with him.
Her nude and mutulated body
was found by her 10 year old
brother while the defendant.
was attempting
to wash the
girl's spattered blood from his
arms and hands. The conviction was reversed because the
defendant willingly and freely admitted commission of the
crime without being informed
of his right to an attorney
prior to the commencement of
the questioning. Theincriminating
statements
were not
coerced. The defendants
admissions were true. Yet to proteet Anderson's
rights,
his
conviction was reversed. But
what
of the. Constitutional
rights of the dead girl and
what of the Constitutional
rights of her family? What of
the rights of the next 13 year
old girl to be confronted
by
Mr. Ariderson?

Yet what of the truth of the.
admission and what of the
guilt of the defendant?
The
formal objectives of the Court
have become so dominant that
the truth of the admission is
irrevelant and the guilt of the
defendant is immaten~l. T?e
Court "will refuse to inquire
into the prejudicial nature of
the admissions
or into the
Weight of the other evidence
of guilt." The ,defendant's convtction and prescribed
punishment must be nullified if
the new rule is violated.

PEOPLE
V.
PECKHAM,
PEOPLE
V. CURRY
and
JAMES, and PEOPLE V. POLLOCK' all three of these cases
were reversed within a matter
of 48 hours the District Court
of Appeals 'being compelled to
so do "in the light of the recent decision of our Supreme
Court in PEOPLE V. DORADO." In the POLLOCK case,
the defendant had been in the
business of defrauding
innof
cent people of thousands
0
dollars. In reversing the con-
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viction and punishment,
the
Court said: "Suffice it to say
tha t the
evidence
demonstrates beyond any reasonable
doubt that the appellant perpetrated
a bunco scheme."
However, whether the defendant was guilty or not was of
minor
importance.
Because
the defendant admitted to police officers while driving to
the station that he was guilty
and because the officers taking Pollock to the station
house had neglected to tell
him prior to his admission of I
his right to an attorney and
to remain silent and because
his admission was a part of
the lower court trial, the conviction was reversed.
There can be no doubt about
it, criminals are being freed
for the sake of the new rule.
But, the argument
goes, we
should
design
our judicial
structure so that not one innocent man be wrongly convicted of a crime, 'even if it
means that 100 guilty men are
set free. The rules should favor the accused. But it might
be asked what if 200 guilty
men are' set free, or 500, or
1,000, or to be more precise
1,700, this being the number
of petitions already submitted
to the courts of this state
alone by men convicted of
crimes and now serving sentences in our state penitentiaries. These men are claiming that under the DORADO
and ESCOBEDO deelsions, they
to? ha_ve been deprived of a
fall' -trtal as. they we:-e ~ever
told of their Constltu~lonal
right to an attor?-ey pno,~ to
their case reaching he
accusatory stage."
When weighing the number
of innocent
men who will
escape an unjust. conviction
due to the new rule against
the number of innocent persons who will suffer at the
hands of criminals released by
the Court's absolute application of the new rule to free
those unquestionably guilty.the
result of ESCOBEDO and DORADO seems to be a step backward. These decisions forget
that the purpose or the Constitution is not limited to the
right of a criminal to have an
attorney. It's well to remembel' that there are other sections of the Constitution
besides the Sixth Amendment.
They tell us this Document
was ordained
to "Establish
justice, insure domestic tranquility, promote the general
welfare," and provide for our
(Conth~ued on page 16)
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cessful. The hearts of PDP
were never lighter when they
enthusiastically
greeted a clan
of devastating
nurses at a
beachouse in Playa. Del Rey.
The event was marred by several incidents, including the
commission of a crime; a well
executed conspiracy and subsequent escape with the goodies. But thanks to the gentlemenly conduct of the pledges,
especially Joe. Battaglia,. the
!rills were thnlled all night.
The "model" of behavior was
Jim Hawkins, who epitomized
the Aristotelian conception of
"moderation."
The social seed was planted
that night, and Paul Gilbert
and Gary Glausner, with the
help of many others, chose to
cultivate it into a violent social eruption. They charmed an
S.C. sorority into coming to a
mixer at Paul's old frat. house
on the S.C. campus. The girls
arrived at 8:30 ready for action and were greeted by all
of 6 frat. members. Everyone
else was watching the "Bruin
game on the tube. But the
game finally ended, and ~he
guys found time to stomp w:th
the girls to the pulsating
sounds' of the "Housewreckers." (we're glad you finally
found what you were after,
Melone, and don't hesitate to
drop in again).
The social juggernaut
is
well oiled now and ready to
go into high gear for our annual cocktail party on March
27 (Thanks
Ken). It should
be interesti~g to converse with
the faculty in a different atmosphere.

Some of the more reckless
members may even be coaxed
into doing the watusi. The f~aternity has passed a resolutlOn
that it will not settle for the
twist.
Th~ ssmester will reach its
social culmination
when the
pledges are installed at the
County Courthouse
under a
very impressive ceremony and
feted to a banquet afterwards.
These social engagements
were. not simply distractioI_!.s
for mentally weary students.
They were the catalysts that
generated an "espirit de corps"
among the pledge class. There
is a closeness and cohesiveness
among this great bunch of
guys that is readily apparent
to any observing
onlook~r.
This feeling. is expressed in
one word, "fraternalism,"
and
there is no doubt that the
juggernaut
will continue
to
roll next year.
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THE J.D. VERSUS THE LL.B. AS THE FIRST PROFESSIONAL DEGREE, IN LAW
By John G. Hervey
Reprinted from the February,
1965 issue of Obiter Dicta -

"The most common erroneous question posed is 'Is the
LL.B. equivalent to the Ph.D.?'
or, put another way, 'How can
you call this a doctorate when
there is no research requirement?' The fallacy is that one
cannot
compare
a non-professional
researcher
degree
with a professional degree, any
more than one can compare
apples with oranges. The LL.
B/J.D. is not a Ph.D. But on
the other hand, a Ph.D. is not
an LL.B./J.D. Neither is any
better or worse than the othTo debase the LL.B./J.D. because there is no dissertation
requirement,
is
essentially
equivalent to saying that the
Ph.D. is inferior to the LL.B./
J.D. because it does not develop a mind trained in legal
method. The nature
of the
Ph.D. is that it demands original research.
The nature
of
the LL.B./J.D. is that it develops the analytic legal mind
... So long as one ignores the
fact that there are two kinds
of doctorates
professional
and research-and
so long as
the standard to which a first
professional
degree must be
compared is the Ph.D., no first
professional
degree can be a
doctorate. However, this does
not correspond with reality, as
the M.D. and D.D.S. would be
excluded . . . Only when we
free our minds from the erroneous notion that all doctorates must be the same can we
proceed to choose between the
L.L.B. and J.D. on a proper
basis."

My position is predicated on
logic, policy, analogy and psychology. I favor unqualifiedly
the J.D. degree as the first
professional degree in law for
those who enter law school
with a prior bachelor's degree,
based on the conventional program of tour ears 'or-successful 'College work.
Let me say preliminarily that
I take it for granted that my
listeners are familiar generally with the literature
at
least conversant with the very
able presentation
of Professor
Marcus Schoenfeld which appeared in the September 1963
issue of the Cleveland-Marshall Law Review and with the
excellen t Report of the AALS
Committee on Graduate Study
on the use of the degree of
Juris Doctor which Report will
be before AALS for action at
this Annual
Meeting.
Dean
Stanley
Samad of the University of Akron has prepared
a splendid paper on this matter and I have his permission
to' lean hea vily thereon
in
what I shall have to say.
Professor
Schoenfeld
has
painted out well (1) that the
problem is both old and newdiscussed seriously sixty years
ago, revived during the thirties, and now discussed anew;
(2) that '.'the academic
degree is.assentially a shorthand
way of signifying
that
the
holder has completed a specific course of study at an eduThe fact is that 55 of the
cational institution - the delaw schools
grees being divided into bach- A.B.A. approved
elor's, masters'
and doctors'; now require a baccalaureate
(3) that professional
doctor- degree for admission. The furates, e.g. M.D. and D.D.S., his- ther fact is that 25 of the said
confer the
torically
have been distin- schools presently
guished from "research
doc- J.D. degree. The final fact
torates,"
e.g. Ph.D., S.J.D.; emerges that the great ma(4) that "the nature of basic jority of schools which require
professional
degrees is that a degree for admission confer
they carry no implication
of the LL.B. This latter fact is
said to be attributable
(1) to
original research qualification,
nor of creation of a substan- the anomalous development of
tial addition to existing knowl- legal education in the U. S.,
(so-calledge"; (5) that once this sys- (2) to tr.aditionalism
tem or heirarchy, of degrees is ed) in the schools (3) to the
of the J.D. by
und~rstood,
many
seeming non-conferral
the schools commonly regardconflicts are resolved.
One realizes
that
certain ed as leaders in legal educaseeming-issues
in fact simply tion. Some of the latter equate
do not exist except in seman- their LL.B. degree to a docThe
Harvard
Law
tics. They are the result of torate.
applying the language forms School, for example, which reof the prior hierarchy
to the quires a prior college degree
present
scheme. Often con- for admission, does not confer
fusion results from asking the the J.D., it was so recommended by the faculty but vewrong question."

toed by the corporation)
but
adds prestige to its LL.B. degree by robing the graduates
in doctoral gowns and assigning them rank between the
candidates
for masters'
and
research
doctors' degrees in
the academic procession.
I would be perfectly willing
to defend, if time permitted,
the thesis that the LL.B. can
be equated today to the Ph.D.
in many fields. It so happens
that I hold the LL.B. from
what I would classify as no
more than a second rate law
school (the University of Oklahoma) and the Ph.D. from an
Ivy League institution
(the
University of Pennsylvania).
I
have had an educational
experience that most of you have
not had. I can bear personal
testimony that the work which
was exacted of me for my LL.
B. in a second-rate law school,
both intensively
and extentensively, exceeded that required for my Ph.D. (research
doctorate)
in any Ivy League
university.
And that is true
notwithstanding
the foreign
language requirements
for the
Ph.D.
The content of the Ph.D. in
many fields in the run-of-themill institution,
as I view it,
has been so downgraded that
it is litle more today than an
endurance
test. It must be
hurdled successfully in order
to acquire that "union card"
which is so necessary for professorial advancement
in the
"educational
shop." But that
is another matter for another
day. Let us get to the subj ect
at hand.
The J.D. is the logical degree. As the late Professor
Beale and Dean Sam ad have
pointed out,.it
is absurd to
award a second bachelor's degree, the LL.B. for advanced
professional
work, to those
who already
hold
a first
bachelor's
degree. This more
especially when admission is
based on standards that equal
or exceed those of the graduate school or the other professional divisions of the parent institution.
The usual amount
of college work required is three years for medicine and dentistry;
two years
for veterinary
medicine and
osteopathy,
and one year for
chiropody
and
optometry.
Practioners
in these professional areas hold professional
doctorates-D.D.,
D.D.S., D.M.
V. etc. If graduates of schools

of medicine, dentistry,
osteopathy, veterinary
medicine,
chiropody
and
optometry,
none of which must have a
bachelor's
degree for admission, are to receive professional doctorates, why should
the law schools lag behind?
It simply does not make sense.
The J.D. should be conferred as a matter of policy. Law
study involves tough, intellectual materials.
It involves
the highest mental capacities
in terms of ability to think
deeply, critically and creatively.
The same values and attend'ant problems and study that
concern the philosopher,
political
scientist,
sociologist,
and economist
concern
the
law student-the
appreciation
of values in a democratic soCiety and human dignity in
a free and affluent SOCiety.
As a matter
of analogy, I
need remind you only of the
"professional
doctorates"
in
the field of medicine, dentistry, and other fieIds heretofore
indicated. These fields furnish
adequate
precedents
for awarding a "proresstonat doctorate" as the first degree' in a
professional field to the study
of which the student brings a
prior' college degree. Bear in
mind, if you will, that the
great majority of the schools
In other professional fields do
not require a prior college degree for admission. Nevertheless, the graduates are awarded "professional
doctorates"
regardless of whether they entered with a prior college degree.
As a matter of psychology,
I believe Sincerely that awarding the J.D. will heighten the
image of the law school in
the minds of general university administrators
and boards
of control. In journeying about
the country and visiting law
SChDOls,time and time again,
in institutions
in which the
medical school gets preferred
treatment,
these people have
said to me: "Why should the
law school be preferred
over
undergraduate
divisions of our
institution? After all, the work
leads only to a bachelor's degree." The fact is that those
who allocate the funds among
the several divisions of an institution
think
of the law
school simply as "another undegraduate
division" and act
accordingly. The president of
one institution
of which I am
(Continued

on page 15)
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terparts
are
addressed
as ing upon the length of the
.
.
"Doctor."
Our
government period of study and the para for~e~, de~n sal.d. qUl~e lawyers in foreign countries ticular university attended.
~ra~kly : A. pi oressor in this are downgraded in esteem and
My study of the traditional
Institution
IS
a professor. I respect when they hold the
degree carries me back to
?on't car~ whether he is teach- LL.B. only and their adversarBologna which is reputed to
mg Engl1sh, mathematics
or ies hold the doctorate
law. They will be treated alike.
You may as well ask: "Wh'a,t have conferred the first degrees. The first faculty there
No preference will be given to
those who instruct in the law are the arguments against the dated back to 1088. Its first
school." His predecessor, at the J.D. degree? Your presentadegrees were in law-a
doctime I had been engaged, had tion sounds reasonable. Why torate in law. The teachers of
promised that law school sal- don't we do it?" The so-called Roman and Comparative Law
aries could be geared to the arguments against it fall into will recall Inerius of Bologna
medical school scale. Boards of several categories. First: it is and his teachings of the Rocontrol and university admin- argued that the law degree man Law following the disistrators, when they come to should not be called a "doc- covery of the Code Justinian.
the allocation of funds to the torate" because there is no Subsequently,
Bologna, conmedical schools, not to men- specific research requirement.
ferred doctorates in divinity,
tion the departments
of bio- This objection simply discloses medicine, grammar, logic, and
logical or physical sciences at the lack of understanding
of philosophy in addition to the
the present moment, usually the inquirer-he
does not un- doctorate in civil and canon
are non parsimonious.
derstand
the difference
be- law. Thus it is that tradition
The basic problem of the tween the "professional"
and is not against the J.D. degree.
law schools, other than moti- the
"research"
doctorates,
The so-called tradition
of
vation, at the moment, is lack There is no research requireof adequate funds. They need ment for the M.D., D.D.S., D. the LL.B. degree developed at
and are entitled to more mon- .M., D.O., or D.V.M. Members the time when law study
ey. I know that many law of many boards of control of moved from the law offices to
school ::j.dministrators have la- law schools simply are not the law schools. At that time
of
bored hard to educate those aware of the distinction be- there was no requirement
prior
college
work
for
admisWho provide and allocate the tween "professional" and "refunds. Some have become dis- search" doctorates. They need sion to the law schools and,
in many schools, the program
couraged and have resigned. education on the point.
of law study covered only two
Awar'dirig the
J.D. degree
It is argued also that awardyears. In 1906, for example, 96
would, in my humble opinion, ing the J.D. will discourage reschools conferred
the LL.B.
induce university
presidents search degrees in law-it
will
degree. But 48 of the 96 reand boards of control to think downgrade the J.S.D. and S.
quired a high school educaof their law schools as gradu- J.D. degrees. There is no proof
tion for admission although
ate or professional
divisions that this has been true in the
and equate them with the past. My guess would be that the period of law study covered three years. In 32 other
medical schools. It would help the percentage of graduates of
schools which awarded the L
to overcome the common prac- the University of Chicago Law
L.B., the period of law study
tice of regarding
the law School" which has conferred
covered only two years. Moreschool as "just another bache- the J.D. for many years, who
over, 16 others of the 96 had
lor's degree" divisions.
have gone on for the research
a period of law study of three
Finally, the J.D. degree is doctorates
in law compares
years but admitted for study
necessary to equate posture of favorably with that of any
persons with less than high
lawyers who enter
govern- school which confers the LL.
school education.
Such was
merit service. The fact is that B. Horeover, the conferral of
the so-called tradition
as it
some government
agencies, the M.D. in medicine or the
had developed in American leboth federal and state, allo- D.D.S. in dentistry
has not
gal education by 1906. I recate a larger number of points, downgraded the research despectfully submit that it is not
for purposes of salary increases grees in those fields-Master
a tradition which is worthy of
and promotions, to holders of of Anesthesiology, Master of
emulation
in 1963 for the
the J.D. than to holders of the Biogradiology. Master of Dengraduates of approved schools
LL.B. The holder of the J.D. tal Surgery, Doctor of Medical
who enter
upon their
law
degree "gets there firstest with Science, Master of Gynecology
studies with a college degree
the mostest" both in salary and Obstetrics, Master of 1'11in the arts or sciences.
and rank because governmenternal
Medicine, Master
of
tal agencies discriminate
be- Optometry, Doctor of Medical
Some argue that inasmuch
tween holders of the J.D. and SCience, and Master of Medi- as the J.D. is not now awarded
by Ivy League schools in the
the LL.B. Admittedly this is cal Science.
East, it should not replace the
unfair to the lawyers in govlt is argued moreover that
ernrnerit service who entered the traditional
degree is the, LL.B. "Let us await adoption
law school with prior college LL.B. This argument rests on first by those schools" runs
degrees but who, upon gradu- where one starts with "tradi- the argument. There ar'e many
ation from law school received tion." The LL.B. appears to answers to this. One weakness
the LL.B. Moreover, one should have been an innovation
of of the non-Ivy League schools
not forget that there are many the English-the
term "Bache- has been their unwillingness
lawyers in government serv- Ier of Lawe" appears in the to blaze "new trails." Legal
ice who are stationed in Lat- works
of Chaucer
(about education in America has been
too much "copyin America and Europe. There 1386). The reference is obscure altogether
Many
mid-western
are no less than 1,000 lawyers because
English
university cat."
in: the Army J.A.G. These are education in law dates back schools, such as Chicago and
stationed at bases around the only a century. In England to- Northwestern to mention only
globe. It is embarrassing
to day those who study under a two, have conferred the J.D.
these lawyers to be addressed law faculty receive a B.A. or degree for many years. Their

reputations
are just as respectable as those of the Ivy
League schools. I honestly believe that if one of the leading
eastern
schools, e.g. N.Y.U.,
Columbia, Yale or Harvard,
should change to the J.D. at
least fifty other schools would
make like changes in twelve
months. If awarding the J.D.
be justifiable
on grounds of
logic, policy, analogy, and psychology, let us forget what the
Ivy Leaguers do.
lt is argued that awarding
the J.D. will make for difficulty in classifying the degree.
"Will the J.D. be an 'undergraduate' or a 'graduate' degree," so runs the argument.
The answer is, of course, that
it is neither. It is a "first professional degree in law." The
difficul ty here would be no
different or greater than in
classifying the M.D., D.O., D.
D.S., or D.V.M. A pattern of
classification already has been
established
for programs of
professional schools and classification presents no obstacle.

It is argued by some that it
will be difficult to process any
recommendation
for such a
change in the degree through
the hierarchy of committees,
etc. in the parent institution
of which' the law school is an
integral part. The argument is
that degrees are conferred by
the parent institution and not
by the law school and thus
any change
in the degree
would require favorable action
by the University Senate and
such committees
thereof as
may have jurisdiction.
Such
situations do exist. It is unfortunate,
in my judgment,
that any law school faculty
should not have open lines of
communication directly to the
president and board of control
of any institution
which operates a law school. Even so,
I cannot believe that either
Senate or faculty committees
in any institution
worthy of
a law school would veto a proposal which rests on logic and
sound grounds of policy, analogy and psychology, if the law
faculty be ready to undertake
the
education
necessary
among their collegiate associates. lt may require hard work
in some institutions
but that
is no reason to be faint-hearted. Assuredly the fact that
such a recommendation would
have to mount hurdles of rac-'
ulty hierarchy in some institutions is no- reason for failure
to act in those institutions
(Continued

on page 16)
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NOON LE:CTURE
SERIES

ADVOCACY
PROGRAM

The American Law Students
The first installment of thl
where the hierarchy does not Association program on Ad- recently initiated Noon Lee
exist.
vocacy was held Saturday, ture Series was presented Feb
In summary, let me conclude Feb. 27, in the Loyola John ruary 24 in the Loyola Johr
as I began. I personally favor F. Kennedy Moot Court Room. F. Kennedy Moot Court Roo
unequivocally awarding the The event was under the
Speaker at the auspiciou
J.D. degree to those graduates chairmanship of Charles Jones, beginning lecture was Bernar]
of approved law schools who President of the Loyola stu- E. Witkin of the San Fran!
hold prior bachelor's degrees dent Bar Association.
cisco Bar and author of til
based on the conventional proThe
presentation
was highly regarded tomes on Cal"
gram of four years of college through a panel consisting of fornia Evidence, Procedure
work. That is my personal tl~e leaders of the California Civil and Criminal Law.
opinion and does not repre- trial bar, Joseph A. Ball and]
Mr. Witkin focused his a
sent the official position of the RaoulD. Magana, and panel- tention on the intricacies an
Council of the Section, the ist-moderator
Justice otto nuances of jurisdictional pro
Board of Governors or the Kaus of the Appellate Court,of lems with a seven-phase e)!
House of Delegates of A.B.A. California, Second Circuit.
amination of the subject.
You know already, however
These gentlemen discussed' The series are open to prac
BECKER RETIR'ES
that at the Annual Meeting of advocacy at the various stages tieing attornies, Uriiverslty (
Professor Jacob J. Becker A.B.A. in the year 1906 the of the trial process, consider- Southern California and Uni
has announced that he will re- Committee on Legal Education ing problems in connection versity of California at La
tire at the end of the current recommended the adoption of with voir dire, opening state- Angeles law students as we
term. Professor Becker has a resolution favoring the J.D. merit, presentation of evi- as the Loyola Law School st
taught Corporation, Negoti- degree for those "who have dence, examination and cross- dents.
able Instruments, Mortgages previously obtained a degree examination of witnesses, oband Legal Ethics at Loyola in arts or science." There has
and final arguments. DIBBLE"SA'BBATICAL
since he joined the faculty in been, so far as I can discover jections
Their solutions were as
1935.He was Acting Dean from in reading the annual Reports varied as the many situations
Dean J. Rex Dibble began
1937through 1941.He was the of A.B.A.,no retreat from that encountered but their one six month sabbatical leav
founding father of the Loyola position. The position of the overriding criterion was the starting In February. He wi
chapter of Phi Delta Phi, Ag- committee on Legal Education same-that
of good taste.
devote much of this time to
geler Inn.
. of 1906 and my position are
Members of the bar, Uni.- paper on certain aspects (
based on logic, policy, anal- versity of Southern California free speech.
He will easily be remember- ogy, and psychology.
and University of California
In the interim Lloyd T'ev
ed by the faculty, alumni and
I strongly recommend that at Los Angeles law students in I is the Acting Dean and Donal
his present students. The reason why? Because-the com- the matter receive the earnest addition to Loyola students, Cowen is the Acting Associai
Dean.
prehensive coverage of the consideration of every approv- were in attendance.
courses, the hints on future ed law school. I believe sincourtroom behavior (or "what cerely that awarding the J.D.
are you going to tell the Degree as the first profession, I
judge?), reminders to leave a al degree in law to those who
.Iittle earlyto allow for traffic enter law school with a prior
EASTER
mishaps, and the Becker- college degree will upgrade the
law schools in the eyes of the'
Goldie Debate.
public and in the consideraHe leaves a legacy of well tion given to law schools by
GREET!NGS
taught students who have a boards of control and universiuniversal regard for a gentle- ty administrators, all of which
man, teacher, a lawyer. He rs will redound to the credit of
undeniably a part of the the proression, the improveLoyola Law School tradition ment of the law schools, and
that did not cease to exist
when the structure at 1137 the institutions of which they
are a part.
South Grand was razed.
society "protection under the
law," protection from Dorado,
Escobedo, Anderson, Pollock,
etc. A decision such as Dorado
"may" protect one innocent
man while letting thousands
of guilty men free 'to prey
.upon their defenseless victims.
It is simply a weighing process.
As of now, the scales of justice 'are weighted heavily in
favor of the criminal .The
time has come for them to regain their equilibrium.
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